A Collage of Memories from the past
http://www.scribd.com/doc/83916444/Agha-H-Amin-Publications
Inspiration to write this article.
Preliminary note on relative magnitude of Bara Pind as far as casualties inflicted on the enemy were concerned
The Indians suffered heavy casualties at Sulaimanke.Some 190 Killed, 196 Missing most of whom were killed or prisoners and 425 wounded.
These casualties were far heavier than those suffered by 54 Division which fought battles like those around Bara Pind Jarpal which suffered a total of some 76 Killed and 272 wounded.
General K.M Arif visits his parent regiment 11 Cavalry near Pasrur after de-escalation
http://pakistan-army-interviews.blogspot.com/2010/11/1971-war-in-west-pakistan-strategic-and.html
http://pakistan-army-interviews.blogspot.com/2010/11/pakistan-army-from-1965-to-1971.html
A Story of the miserable Command Failure of Pakistans 1 Corps led by Lieutenant General Irshaad,8 Infantry Division led by Major General Abdul Ali Malik and 8 Independent Armoured Brigade at Bara Pind in 1971 War.
Valuable human lives sent into certain and pointless slaughter simply because of poor leadership and planning.
In the Memory of all who participated in that bloody tank battle
Major Agha H Amin (Tank Corps-Pavo Cavalry)
Second Lieutenant Yaqub Malik ,Troop Leader 13 Lancers , brother of Brigadier Faruq Yaqub (11 Pavo Cavalry) and son of Lieut Colonel Yaqub Malik (Pavo Cavalry) killed in action at Bara Pind
INDIAN SOLDIERS STANDING ONE OF THE DESTROYED PATTON TANKS OF 13 LANCERS IN THE BATTLE
THIS IS NOT SOMETHING COPY AND PASTE BUT BASED ON ENTIRELY ORIGINAL RESEARCH OF MAJOR A.H AMIN FROM 1983 TO 1999 AND ONE OF THE CHAPTERS OF :--
54 Indian Division advanced two brigades up both supported by tanks from 16 Armoured Brigade with 47 Brigade on the right and 91 Brigade on the left while the third brigade ie 74 Brigade in reserve.
47 Brigade was assigned the mission of contacting Basantar Nala opposite general area Lagwal-Jarpal and establishing a bridgehead on the west bank of Basantar Nala through which 74 Brigade was to breakout towards Zafarwal.
91 Brigade was to move on the east flank of 54 Division. By 15th December the 47 Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) closed with Basantar Nala opposite Lagwal and made a successful assault across the minefield laid in the bed of Basantar Nala on night 15/16 December15.
A tough infantry fight took place and one of Indian infantry battalion commanders was killed during this operation16.
The 47 Indian Infantry Brigade was tasked to establish a bridgehead in general area Sikandarpur-Lalial-Barapind17.
It captured Siraj Chak and Laleal Forest at 8.30 p.m and Jarpal at 11.30 p.m18. Stiff fighting took place at Jarpal; and Major Hoshiar Singh a hardy Sikh Jat from Sisana in Hissar district was awarded a Param Vir Chakra; India's highest gallantry award18a.
This forced Indian 47 Brigade Commander to ask 17 Poona Horse to move into the bridgehead at once.
As per the Indian armoured corps historian, the situation was so desperate that one squadron of Poona Horse was rushed across part of the minefield even though a lane had not been cleared18b.
Captain Ejaz Alam , Squadron Commander 13 Lancers ,Bara Pind,killed in action while leading his tank squadron
A firefight followed and Indians claim that they destroyed a Pakistani Sherman despite having no night firing capability!
The forward extent of the bridgehead was east of the Lalial Reserve Forest and this forced the Poona Horse tanks to cross the forest at night and establish themselves on its western edge, so as to be able to effectively engage any counter attack force the next morning.
The CO of 17 Horse also joined C Squadron along with RHQ Troop. The rest of the regiment followed and by first light the whole 17 Poona Horse was deployed; 'C' Squadron opposite Lalial village and to the south of it on the forward edge of the forest, 'B' Squadron less two troops south of 'C' Squadron opposite Ghazipur and 'A' Squadron in reserve in area Siraj Chak a village east of Ghazipur on the eastern side of the reserve forest.
Lieutenant Colonel Hanut Singh , Commanding Officer 17 Poona Horse in the Basantar Sector during 1971 War.
Colonel Hanut Singh the commanding officer of Poona Horse was a bluebooded Rajput from one of Indo Pak sub continents most eminent families ! He is the elder brother of former Finance minister of India, Jaswant Singh Jasol (Jasol is the name of the village in Barmer district of Rajasthan). He retired as Lt. General.
It is significant to note that the Indians were all praise for the Pakistani infantry defending Jarpal; unlike the Pakistani infantry on the north i.e. opposite 6 and 16 Madras18c.
A Pakistani tank burning after being hit
THE 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE COUNTER ATTACK ON BARAPIND JARPAL -16 DECEMBER 1971
It appears that Headquarters 1 Corps did not seriously appreciate the gravity of 54 Indian Division's advance towards Zafarwal. 8 Armoured Brigade was concentrated in general area Qila Sobha Singh-Pasrur from 11th December onwards. On 15th December the brigade was told to be prepared for ' a brigade attack east of Bein Nala to recapture lost territory up to River Ravi'!19
It may be noted that no effort was made to impose caution on the advancing enemy who leisurely breached all three minefields from 5 to 15 December maintaining a rate of mile on an average one and a quarter mile per day. This was not because of paucity of reserves, but paucity of resolution and decisiveness in the 1 Corps Headquarters or in the GHQ to spur 1 Corps! General Fazal Muqeem very accurately described 1 Corps conduct of the defensive battle as 'passive defence of 1 Corps' 20.
8 Armoured Brigade was preparing for the grand counter attack that it was supposed to launch east of Bein Nala to recover all lost territory up to River Ravi which it was supposed to launch in Nainakot area when it was suddenly informed at 0430 hours 16th December by the infantry formation in defence that the enemy had breached the minefield on Basantar Nala at Lagwal21.
At 0515 hours the armoured brigade headquarters issued a warning order assessing an enemy tank squadron and an infantry battalion which had crossed the Basantar Nala and was established in area Lalial Forest and was being 'contained by own infantry and an independent squadron'22. On the other hand the infantry brigade commander of the area i.e. Brigadier Sher Ali Baz (24 Brigade) assessed the enemy in Jarpal as one tank troop and one infantry company!23 Lieutenant General Irshad the 1 Corps Commander ordered 8 Independent Brigade Commander to 'Restore the situation with minimum force'24.
8 Armoured Brigade Commander earmarked 13 Lancers one of its three tank regiments to deal with the situation and gave the following instructions/orders:-
'Approximately squadron of tanks and infantry battalion in village Siraj Chak area on the west bank of Basantar. This penetration has been contained by own infantry/tanks...and directed 13 Lancers to establish a counter penetration position25 in area Pindi Channian west of village Jarpal immediately 26'
13 Lancers along with other 8 Brigade units was located a little south of Zafarwal. It concentrated in Jabal-Mehla area by 0745 hours along with its affiliated armoured infantry company. 'A' Squadron which was earmarked for the 'Counter Penetration' task was briefed by the CO 13 Lancers and crossed road Zafarwal-Shakargarh at 0800 hours.
While on the move it was ordered on wireless by the CO to move towards area Sikandarpur and destroy a few enemy tanks which were breaking out from area Lalial. (It may be noted, that this must have been a false alarm, since no Indian account mentions any such offensive movement at eightish in the morning).
This modification in plan resulted based on new orders from 8 Armoured Brigade Commander who had received these from 24 Infantry Brigade Commander. The brigade commander had asked CO 13 Lancers to 'send a squadron to contain enemy penetration' but the CO decided to 'attack north and destroy enemy tanks'27. 'A' Squadron moved to Sikandarpur and was fired at by enemy tanks/anti-tank guns from Ghazipur village. The squadron formed up and attacked losing in the process 8 tanks and two officers killed and wounded.
The remaining six tanks of A Squadron withdrew and deployed along with Pakistani infantry holding defences at Sakror Bund.
Meanwhile at 0830 hours while 'A' Squadron was moving towards Ghazipur CO 13 Lancers, entirely on his own judgement, also ordered 'C' Squadron to take a 'Counter Penetration Position' in Pindi Chanian area and while 'C' Squadron was preparing to do so changed his orders, ordering both 'B' and 'C' Squadrons to 'proceed to Barapind and attack six to seven enemy tanks and infantry company in Jarpal area'28.
All that followed was disastrous and both the squadrons were engaged by heavy enemy anti-tank and artillery fire, losing twenty tanks and in the process, three officers killed and two officers wounded.
13 Lancers claims that the enemy fell back from Barapind29 (which was of no consequence to both Indians and Pakistanis in any case) while the Indians claim that they had never occupied Barapind30 (again of no consequence even if they had done so).
A destroyed Pakistani tank
It was during this action that Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal a Punjabi Hindu from originally from Sargodha District exhibited extreme valour and saved the Indian position as per the Indian Armoured Corps historian; an action which was acknowledged by grant of a posthumous Param Vir Chakra; India's highest gallantry award.
Arun Khetarpal as a cadet
Second Lieutennat Arun Khetarpal shakes hands with Indian C in C Manekshaw when he visited 17 Poona Horse
We will briefly discuss the Indian position during this whole affair. The Indians were holding the bridgehead as we earlier discussed with two tank squadrons with a third in reserve (it has been erroneously claimed that there were two or three Indian tank regiments defending the bridgehead); 'C' Squadron Poona Horse on the right holding area Lalial and south , 'B' Squadron less two troops holding area Ghazipur and south and two troops of 'B' Squadron beefing up the defences of 3 Grenadier Battalion in village Jarpal.
It was essentially 'C' Squadron Poona Horse which faced 'A' Squadron 13 Lancers and 'B' Squadron Poona Horse which faced 'B' and 'C' Squadrons of 13 Lancers. Once 13 Lancers brought in its two remaining squadrons the Indians reinforced Jarpal with half squadron of its 'A' Squadron which was in reserve in Siraj Chak area.
Once 31 Cavalry attacked the Indians brought the remaining tanks of 'A' Squadron in Jarpal area.
By 1200 hours 13 Lancers which was praised by the Indians for its tremendous valour, keeping aside all the foolhardiness of their modus operandi,31 was written off from the order of battle of the 8 Armoured Brigade! The issue now was no longer containment since the Indians were also considerably shaken, having suffered a large number of tank and infantry casualties in the process.
Such was the elan and dash of this attack that the Indian armoured corps historian admitted that 'the only occasion that a breakthrough could have occurred was when two squadrons of 13 Lancers (following Major Nasir's exhortation described in the previous sentence) attacked together in the afternoon, but a gallant last-ditch stand by three tanks of the Poona Horse averted the danger' .
Brigadier Khwaja Mohammad Nasir is another example of defective Pakistani promotion system .He was phenomenally brave at Bara Pind but was not promoted beyond brigadier due to petty intelligence reports of Pakistans miserable intelligence agencies which failed repeatedly in war time intelligence gathering.On the other hand many armour officers who reached two and three and four star ranks like Rahmat ,GA , Ahsan Hayat,Zarrar Azeem etc had near zero war record .All depended on who you knew and how many good ACRs you could manage to increase your oficer efficiency index .
But the Indian historian went further and instead of making ridiculous claims that the Indians were more martial frankly admitted that the Pakistani failure had a direct connection with incompetent leadership. Gurcharan Singh thus said: 'Pakistani armour suffered casualties because of bad use of ground and tactical ineptness'31a.
It was after this second attack of 31 Cavalry that the Indians reinforced the bridgehead with approximately 12 tanks from Brigade headquarters, and half squadron 4 Hodsons Horse.
The situation now was well in control with 27 Cavalry and 35 FF of 124 Brigade in reserve and the Indian threat (that is if there was any despite Pakistani numerical tank superiority of three to one or three to two in Barapind-Jarpal area) was removed.
Remnants of 'A' Squadron 13 Lancers remaining tanks were in counter penetration position opposite Ghazipur, 'B' and 'C' Squadrons in counter penetration position opposite Barapind and Jarpal and 31 Cavalry in the middle.
On night 16/17 December the 8 Brigade and 24 Brigade commander decided to attack the bridgehead which had been most disastrously contained with the third tank regiment 27 Cavalry and 35 FF, both of which were to attack and capture Jarpal (another mud village of no tactical consequence).
The infantry brigade commander who according to many officers of the 24 Brigade rarely left his headquarters however insisted that 35 FF, a newly raised but highly integrated and motivated foot infantry unit to launch a daylight attack without tank support on a bridgehead which two tank regiments had failed to dent !
The commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja led the senseless attack and it is best to quote the Indians who were all praise for the gallantry of this indomitable battalion and were shocked at the senselessness of the whole affair; 'At dawn 39th FF launched its attack for the recapture of Jarpal. The attack was doomed to failure.
Launched in broad daylight as it was over open ground in full view of one tank squadron plus and one infantry battalion and covered by their combined weapons. Tanks and artillery opened fire when the Pakistanis emerged from cover from their forming up place.It was a foolhardy venture,the attackers were literally massacred but they persisted in their attempt to close until the few remnants fell only about 50 metres from tanks of 4 Hodsons Horse.
At about that time the news of Pakistani acceptance of ceasefire was received. The whole of this gallant battalion was sacrificed to no purpose...ceasefire became effective at 8.00 p.m. and guns fell silent on both sides. "
The next day 80 dead bodies of the 39th Frontier Force including their commanding officer, second in commands and adjutants were handed over to the Pakistanis'37'
Hail Indomitable Heroes Hail! Despite of all your Generals and Brigadiers ye prevailed!
This battle was in my mind when I wrote these remarks in the visitors book of the Armour Mess Nowshera in mid 1993 at the time of the Armoured Corps Commanding Officers Conference
The Indians rightly awarded two of their highest gallantry awards to their soldiers, but nothing beyond an SJ was granted to the brave men who died at Barapind-Jarpal !
(I refer to the tank regiments although I believe that Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja was miserly awarded a posthomous Hilal i Jurrat although he deserved a Nishan i Haidar ---but then what were Akrams disqualifications ? He did not belong to an old battalion which could link him to the generals mostly from old battalions and did not have that old boy network ? Now compare this with Nishan i Haidars awarded in 1965 on dubious grounds--Refers Major General Tajammul Hussain Maliks interview done by this scribe in September 2001 and also available on this site)
The Indians even awarded their highest award to Major Hoshiar Singh Cheema who survived the battle but many equally brave soldiers of 13 Lancers, 31 Cavalry or 35 FF were not considered worthy of being awarded a Nishan-i-Haidar.
Perhaps there is something seriously wrong with the whole system of the award of gallantry in our army?
What is the basis ; is it that an officer has won the Sword of Honour or is from an old regiment, or that his citation was written well, or that he was liked by his brigade or divisional commander before the war?
Fazal-i-Muqeem well summed up at least 8 Division's performance (commanded by Major General Abdul Ali Malik) when he said:--
'The few counter attacks, which 8 Division tried during the war were most noticeable by their lack of planning. The units were hurled into battle without having been given enough time for planning and preparations'.3
ANALYSIS
Impact of Experiences of 1965 War on the Principal Decision Makers' Minds.
Most analysis of Barapind-Jarpal are unfortunately superficial because they concentrate on the superficial aspects of the whole affair. The principal reason for the failure at Barapind was neither the artillery factor, nor the assessment of situation, nor incompetence of the armoured brigade commander but something much deeper. This was the deep impact of experiences of 1965 war on the principal decision makers' mind.
First of all we will discuss Brigadier Ahmad the commander of 8 Armoured Brigade. Brigadier Ahmad, had distinguished himself as a squadron commander at Gadgor in 1965 war a few miles west of Degh Nala and had played a major role in the failure of the Indian 1st Armoured Division's failure to achieve a major breakthrough on 8th September. It appears that this experience at Gadgor shaped many of his actions in 1971.
The Battle of Gadgor was a peculiar battle in which Pakistan's 25 Cavalry had clashed with two tank regiments of the Indian Army, with both units on the march and with both deploying in a line formation in a most impromptu manner without knowing the strength or composition of the enemy in front.
The Indians had the potential to outflank 25 Cavalry by virtue of having nine tank squadrons against three of 25 Cavalry but failed because their armoured brigade commander (who ironically commanded 1 Indian Corps in 1971) was unnerved due to reports of a false alarm on his flank.
The action at Gadgor was a glorious feat as far as 25 Cavalry and then Major Ahmad were concerned.
But it was one of those unique incidents which rarely occur in military history!Both sides did not know, who was opposing them; 25 Cavalry having no clue that they were opposing the whole Indian armoured division and the Indian 1st Armoured Division thinking that they were opposed by an armoured brigade!
Artillery was of no consequence in this action since both sides clashed by accident and artillery fire made a limited impact on the battle! At this time there were no armoured brigades in Pakistan 6 Armoured Division and the Battle of Chawinda was fought as a largely ad hoc battle with divisional headquarters directly telling units what to do.
It appears that Gadgor experience influenced both Brigadier Ahmad and GOC 8 Division who at that time was commanding 24 Infantry Brigade at Gadgor. Later on artillery played a pivotal role in defeating deliberate Indian assaults opposite Chawinda from 12th to 21 September 1965.
However these were downplayed because of the inter arm rivalry and Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Choudhry the architect of artillery plan at Chawinda was sidelined and retired as a brigadier despite having had a brilliant career.
Post 1965 propaganda in Pakistan painted the Battle of Chawinda as a triumph of armour and infantry; hardly ever admitting that artillery played any role in it! This was due to the British inherited legacy in which artillery was despised as an arm by infantry and armour officers!Now we will discuss 13 Lancers.
The experiences of this unit in 1965 war played a major role in conditioning its attitude in 1971. In 1971 this unit was launched in Chamb against an Indian Squadron equipped with AMX-13 tanks which had no potential to oppose the six to one tank superiority concentrated against them by Pakistan in Chamb during Operation Grand Slam.
Even technically AMX-13 was a matchbox with extremely thin armour as compared to the Patton/Sherman tanks employed by Pakistan against it. 13 Lancers was conditioned by the Grand Slam experience when it was opposed by an enemy which was outnumbered, as well as surprised. This experience conditioned their behaviour in 1971 and they had faith in the tank charge which had succeeded in Grand Slam in front of AMX-13 but had no chance of success in front of Centurions of a tank regiment as illustrious as 13 Lancers!
DOCTRINAL AND OTHER TACTICAL FAILURES
Brigadier Jahangir Karamat (later General) who was from 13 Lancers categorically said that the armoured briagde commander asked both 13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry to attack as soon as possible implying that there was no need to cut short the batle procedure and there was no need to panic;but both the units and specially 13 Lancers cut through various parts of the battle procedure like liaision with infantry,preliminary recce etc leading to the phenomenal tank losses that it later suffered.
Even the method of attack of both units was different;which proved that even at brigade level;tactical thinking was whimsical and differed from unit to unit;even in important things like basic drills of operations of war!
CRUX OF THE WHOLE ISSUE
There is one fact which is missed in most analysis’s of the Battle of Barapind and most other tank battles of Indo-Pak war.This refers to handling of units above regiment level.
There is one striking parallel between Battle of Gadgor fought in 1965 where 25 Cavalry checked the 1st Indian Armoured Briagde(ie 1st Indian Armoured Div) and in Barapind where 16 Light Cavalry stopped the whole 8 Armoured Brigade.
The fact that stands out is that handling of unit till regiment level was good in defence while handling of units beyond brigade level was extremely poor and especially in offensive operations! Even the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division which did well in Chawinda fought an essentially defensive battle.
In Gadgor, 25 Cavalry did extremely well as a unit but the Indians failed miserably as a brigade at Gadgor;despite a four to one superiority; and the same happened at Barapind.
The conclusion is that both the armies failed to function as dynamic entities beyond regimental level!The troops and the young leaders till squadron were equally brave and leaders beyond unit level almost equally weak in handling more than one unit.
Even in Khem Karan Pakistani armour succeded till unit level but failed misearbly beyond in attack; which is a far more difficult operation to coordinate, execute and synchronise than attack.
Thus Khem Karan was triumph of 6 Lancers and failure of 4 and 5 Armoured Brigades in attack!
The same tendency was present at the Corps level, althoughn the Indians improved over it since they had the system of corps in vogue earlier than Pakistan Army.
They learnt it from 1965 when their 1 Corps had miserably failed to function as a Corps.
Even in Shakargarh the Indians failed to concentrate more than one armoured regiment at any one place at a particular time.
The Battle of Barapind was the triumph of one unit over a brigade in defence but proved that the Gadgor experience;ie inability of both armour commanders to handle more than one tank regiment was valid even in 1971!
The only man in the subcontinent who came close to succesful handling of more than one tank regiment in offence was an infantry general (like Rommel) ie General Eftikhar who despite near parity successfully handled an armoured force of more than two tank regiments. A small feat in western military terms but a big one in the Indo-Pak military scenario. Praval the Indian writer hit the nail on the head when he observed that in Shakargarh bulge the Indians failed to concentrate at any one time more than one tank regiment and that at no time was more than one tank regiment in action, or in contact with the enemy.
MAJOR GENERAL EFTIKHAR KHAN (JANJUA) -(HE WAS HALF GERMAN OR FRENCH)
EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES
Clausewitz clearly and repeatedly stated many times in his book 'On War' that a strategic reserve that had no bearing on the decisive battle was a negation of the whole idea of having a strategic reserve. Thus what was the use of 6 Armoured Division or 17 Division when they did nothing and had no bearing on the whole battle of Shakargarh!
There is some truth in Iqbal's verse 'Man never suffers defeat, without perishing he goes into retreat'!
ROLE OF HEADQUARTER 1 CORPS
The only role of 1 Corps Headquarters was handling of Corps reserves but commander 1 Corps abdicated from this responsibility taking no interest in what 8 Armoured Brigade did or what it was supposed to do. 1 Corps Headquarters was as a matter of fact overtaken by the friction of war.
The gears of whole higher command mechanism of 1 Corps were jammed and Commander 1 Corps did not have the powerful iron will to overcome this friction, nor did he have the coup d oeil or operational vision to supply the much needed oil to lubricate the gears of 1 Corps operational ability.
1 Corps possessed numerical superiority over the Indians in armour, the arm of decision and had the potential to make the Indians react to its moves rather than reacting to their moves.
As Fazal Muqeem rightly described 1 Corps assumed a passive role and merely kept reacting instead of seizing the initiative; which was well within its capability; keeping in view the relative superiority in tanks.
So disgusted were the officers with the army high command, that the revolt which finally resulted in the exit of Yahya Khan started from 6 Armoured Division, which was not utilised at all throughout the war.
1 Corps Headquarters was vacillating and indecisive, unable to even assess as to which was the most dangerous enemy threat, and till 15 December was thinking of employing 8 Armoured Brigade for a raid at Nainakot, more than 20 miles east of Barapind!1 Corps Headquarters was also directly responsible for keeping the artillery out of the planning of operations.
Shaukat Riza the official historian of Pakistan Army noted this anti- artillery bias of Headquarters 1 Corps in the following words: 'When Headquarters 1 Corps was established in Gujranwala, its artillery component was driven out nine miles away to Nadipur.
Even for the capture of Dharam Enclave Headquarters Artillery I Corps was kept out of picture'39. Instead of ensuring that artillery, armour and all arms worked as a team, Commander 1 Corps established a precedence which aimed at increasing the inter arm rivalry which both Pakistan and Indian Armies had inherited from the British (but which had been reduced in Indian Army, by virtue of having an artillery C in C etc).
Thus when commander 8 Armoured Brigade made his counterattack plans he did not consult the corps artillery Commander or any other infantry divisional artillery commander at all.
ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION
Barapind-Jarpal was essentially a failure in assessing a situation correctly. There was no doubt from 5 December onwards that the principal threat to Pakistani 1 Corps was from the 54 Division which although very slowly was surely advancing towards Zafarwal-Pasrur complex, possession of which was vital for anyone who wanted to hold the initiative in Shakargarh Bulge.
1 Corps Headquarters failed to assess this simple fact and did not function at all as an operational headquarters except as a post office processing requests for reinforcements.
The crossing of Basantar should not have come as a surprise at all on the morning of 16 December, but it appeared that the corps headquarters was not prepared for this eventuality. Instead the situations assessment was relegated to the holding infantry battalion and the infantry brigade commander made no serious attempt to keep a close liaison with either the armoured brigade headquarters.
Even as late as the morning of 16 December he insisted that enemy strength across Basantar was no more than a tank troop and an infantry company. The armoured brigade commander also made no independent effort to confirm or disregard the assessment of the infantry commander and assumed that a tank regiment could deal with the situation without utilising divisional or corps artillery's fire support.
The CO of 13 Lancers who should have been the most concerned person made no effort to assess the situation and was confident that one tank squadron could deal with the enemy! The engagement that followed was impromptu and 13 Lancers, was committed as a unit of sheer reflex action while conducting fire fights with individual Indian tanks.
ROLE OF 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE HEADQUARTER VIS-A-VIS ITS UNITS
8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters' failed in three counts; i.e.
(1) the assessment of the situation,
(2) ability to employ the tank resources correctly
(3) and in incorporating artillery to support its offensive operations.
The headquarters was formed in 1970 and the concept of an independent brigade fighting in the environment of a corps was new at least as far as the Pakistan Army was concerned.
The operational situation in 1971, was far more complex than the one in 1965 when the 6 Armoured Division was fighting a battle on a twelve mile frontage with an enemy which was only attacking it frontally. In 1971 1 Corps was dealing with an operational situation in which Shakargarh Bulge was being attacked from three distinct directions over a frontage which was more than 60 miles wide with no clear cut operational plan to counter it.
8 Armoured Brigade had worked on about 25 contingencies and operated in an environment in which its corps headquarters was already paralysed by indecision and vacillation.
Later on it became fashionable to criticise Brigadier Ahmad and to state that it was a failure of one man. Brigadier Ahmad was one of the finest officers of the armoured corps and was therefore placed in an independent command.
The failure of 8 Armoured Brigade was not failure of one individual but that of the whole Pakistan Armoured Corps! The blunders were committed at all levels and 13 Lancers lost most of its tanks, not because of Brigadier Ahmad but because of the erratic attitude of its CO who on his own decided to reap some glory by ordering an attack when he had been ordered by his brigade commander to go into counter penetration position.
8 Armoured Brigade Headquarter's major failure was in failure to utilise artillery; but we must remember that at that time and to some extent till even now at least in armoured corps, artillery was despised as an arm, and any other man in Ahmad's place would have acted no differently41.
It appears that 8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters was unnerved once 13 Lancers was decimated and ordered 31 Cavalry to attack at once without realising that the one tank regiment attacking at the same place where another had just failed was against all tactical principles!
It is possible that Brigadier Ahmad was forced to bring in 31 Cavalry since the high losses of 13 Lancers had created a grave situation which could be remedied only by bringing in another tank regiment, to deter the Indians from exploiting their tremendous success against 13 Lancers.
Even the contrast between 13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry's conduct was glaring. 31 Cavalry despite being a new unit conducted its attack in a far more deliberate manner than 13 Lancers; something which was noticed; as we have already discussed even by the Indian armoured corps historian.
The unnecessary losses that 13 Lancers suffered were entirely avoidable had its CO followed the instructions he had received and went for a counter penetration position.
The Indians fought well, but they did so out of sheer desperation ! It is ironic that while armour was singled out as an arm for the Barapind failure,the disease which had led to it was not diagnosed.It was a disease born in the Ayub-Musa era and had a deep connection with the British military legacy afflicting the whole army.
Brigadier Ahmad was not promoted after the war, but this had less to do with Barapind and more with personal likes and dislikes!
GOC 8 Division whose conduct as we have discussed was complimented by Fazal Muqeem was promoted! (the odds favour the areas in between Chenab and Indus rivers )
Another Brigadier who did not have the moral courage to join his brigade in Chamb (Brigadier Rahimuddin-although a tiger in the squash court ) and evaded active service on the pretext of martial law duty, was promoted and became a full general ! But that had more to do with his daughter getting married to the usurper Zias son than with his performance or absence in war !
All along in the war this great captain of war absented himself from his 111 Brigade in Chamb on pretext of being involved in recording summary of evidence of Sheikh Mujeeb ur Rahman ! Had the great Eftikhar Khan Janjua survived this man might not have risen beyond a brigadier
To read more about the ham handed manner in which training is done in Pakistan Army and officers selected for higher ranks read the following :--
http://pakistan-army-interviews.blogspot.com/2010/12/assessmentmilitary-training-and.html
GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION
We will examine this extremely fallacious assertion in brief. The principal decision makers as we have seen assessed that the enemy in front was a troop of tanks or a squadron and thought in a most cavalier manner that it could be swept aside by just sending a tank regiment without any deliberate corps artillery support.
The corps commander specifically used the words restore the situation by use of minimum force, thus implying that the threat was not as grave as to merit the employment of maximum force!Even keeping in view the relative strength the Indians were not capable of achieving much.
What did they have; a tank regiment and two Madras and one Grenadier battalions against three Pakistani tank regiments and one infantry brigade immediately available and one tank division and infantry division within 20 miles of the bridgehead!
And if the threat was so grave, how was it that 1 Corps realised its gravity only at 0430 hours on 16 December.
Two factors stand out in the whole affair.
Also see on the link below assessment of Major GeneralN.U.K Babar about commander of Pakistans 1 Corps:--
http://pakistan-army-interviews.blogspot.com/2010/12/major-general-nuk-babar-on-pakistan.html
One was a vacillating and highly indecisive corps headquarters which had no clear grasp of the operational situation and viewed things in view of straight geometrical lines like a drill sergeant major!
There was no cause for concern and 8 Armoured Brigade was leisurely being told to raid Nainakot till 15 December and suddenly the situation became grave when the enemy crossed the line of no penetration.
What was the rationale in not accepting the gravity of threat from 5 December onwards and resorting to countermeasures to wrest the initiative from the enemy, when it was evident that the intention of this particular enemy division was to capture Zafarwal and to cross the so called line of no penetration!
The second factor which stands out is that 8 Division Commander, 24 Brigade Commander and perhaps the armoured brigade commander wanted to achieve a local victory which they suddenly realised was much required keeping in view the drain on the morale of own troops due to the constant withdrawal through the various layers of minefields since 05 December.
If this was the motivation then the modus operandi in which it was aimed at was extremely costly! The thirst for glory and honour are perfectly reasonable and honourable aspirations provided they are matched by equal willingness to share risks of battle and are accompanied by strength of intellect and ability and the resolution to execute a viable plan.
These were sadly missing in all headquarters from brigade and onwards!It appears that the prime motivation in all the principal decision makers mind at both brigade and regimental level in 8 Armoured Brigade was ''thirst for glory'' which they thought was cheaply purchasable by launching a squadron or two at a force estimated at six or seven tanks or a squadron at the most; not a grave threat, and something that could be dealt with by utilising, just one third of 8 Armoured Brigade's tank strength!
It was only after 16 December when the outcome turned out to be disastrous; was a myth created that 8 Armoured Brigade despite suffering colossal losses had saved Shakargarh Bulge or Zafarwal !
That the enemy in front was a tank brigade or two tank regiments; and certainly not a single tank regiment; which unfortunately was the actual case!
In justice to the brigade commander it must be admitted that he had asked 13 Lancers to contain the enemy by fire; but CO 13 Lancers on his own overzealous attitude decided to attack!
The commanding officer of 13 Lancers had he died like Akram Raja of 35 FF the trauma may have been much less! But armour boys are armour boys and Masood Chhakra was no Sahibzad Gul !
At Chawinda just six years earlier the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division with a lesser strength in infantry but parity in tanks had stopped the whole Indian 1st Armoured Division aided by two infantry divisions from breaking out.
Here at Chawinda; the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division had stopped the Indians not by charging without artillery support; but by making optimum use of tanks containing the Indians by fire and defeating Indian infantry attacks by artillery fire.
At Barapind what was the gravity in containing an Indian infantry brigade with one tank regiment with three tank regiments and one foot infantry and one mechanised infantry battalion by fire as was done six years earlier with exactly the same Patton tanks in defence and the same Indian Centurion tanks seeking to breakthrough!!!!
The failure at Barapind was later rationalised by saying that the Indian threat was grave and that the blunders committed were a natural result of the confusion caused because of the gravity of the threat!
The conduct of the two tank regiments clearly point towards doctrinal procedural and tactical failures particular to the armoured corps.
Due to some phenomenal command blunder artillery fire support was not coordinated and 35 FF attacked without artillery fire support36 at 0530 hours. The infantry battalion was delayed and the armoured brigade commander called off the planned attack34 which was originally scheduled to be launched at 0430 hours 17 December35.
The deliberate manner in which the attack was launched could not compensate for the nominal artillery support and the frontal approach and the attacking squadron of 31 Cavalry was beaten back with a loss of ten out of fourteen tanks destroyed and a squadron commander and another officer killed. The issue now was no longer containment since the Indians were also considerably shaken, having suffered a large number of tank and infantry casualties in the process.
The squadron formed up and attacked losing in the process 8 tanks and two officers killed and wounded. The remaining six tanks withdrew and deployed along with Pakistani infantry holding defences at Sakror Bund.
Since I joined the armoured corps in 1981 I heard thousands of time that despite losses 8 Armoured Brigade had done a wonderful job!
The fact remains that the only people who did a wonderful job despite all the tactical ineptness at regiment and above were the officers and men of 13 Lancers; men like Major Nasir41a who were praised by the Indians, or 35 FF who assaulted in face of certain destruction!
EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARMOUR
The battle of Bara Pind was not only a failure of Brigade and Corps level but also a failure at tactical level.
It is unfortunate that while the armoured brigade commander was criticised, the fact that execution at regimental level played as much a part in failure as the higher headquarters was ignored.The battle even without sufficient artillery support was not as potentially disastrous as made by the piecemeal and cavalier manner in which 13 Lancers was handled in particular by its CO.
Instead of utilising the whole regiment to attack in depth he employed a squadron; ordering it into certain depth. The second attack involving two squadrons, however, came close to achieving a breakthrough; something which was admitted by the Indians and proves that a more deliberate attack by I Lancers could have led to a breakthrough.
Gurcharan Singh thus said, 'Firstly it made no sense to attack with only one squadron at a time. The armour counter attack neither had the numerical advantage nor the depth to have a chance to succeed; the only occasion when a breakthrough could have occurred was when two squadrons of 13 Lancers attacked together in the afternoon, but a gallant last ditch stand by three tanks of Poona Horse averted the danger.'
This proves that a regiment attack with all three squadrons could have succeeded and Bara Pind which has gone down in history as a childish blunder could have been a great battle if Commander 8 Brigade had insisted that 13 Lancers must attack as a regiment ... but then there were serious doctrinal and battle procedures in armoured corps as an arm and the fact that Bara Pind was a fiasco despite the fact that the best officer of the armoured corps was commanding the brigade; does not paint a bright picture about the armoured corps of that time!
Later on the whole blame was heaped on the brigade commander and the fact that the failure had a lot to do with doctrine, poor tactics as taught and practised was ignored. This does not mean that the armoured corps did not have good brigadiers.
Gurcharan Singh saw in Brigadier Nisar the commander of Changez Force a much better commander. He actually praised Changez Force saying; 'Pakistan armour functioned well in the role of covering troops. It managed to delay a superior armour force for a longer period than it could have planned for', a tribute from an enemy to a brigadier who was not promoted for having done well !
It is instructive to note that the Indians have admitted that the day was saved by a 'last ditch stand by just one tank troop leader', which means that Bara Pind like Gadgor in 1965 was a fluke where the Indians were able to hang on by the sheer skin of their teeth, while in 1965 it was one tank squadron in particular and ironically Brigadier Ahmad's squadron with Brigadier Ahmed in lead which saved the day!
Perhaps there is a greater power which decides the fate of armies in which doctrine and tactics are taught in the manner of a novice and concentration is on polo; push and pull etc.
EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY
There was nothing new in employing or not employing artillery at Barapind!
The fact that no use was made of the six field, eight medium and two heavy artillery batteries42 which could have been potentially utilised by 8 Brigade or 24 Brigade or 8 Division proves the presence of a disease which was not presently merely in 8 Armoured Brigade but in the whole army!
Poor employment of artillery had led to a serious British reverse at Chillianwala in January 1849.
The British learnt their lesson and made full use of artillery at the final battle of Gujrat if the 2nd Sikh War as a result of which they won this battle with minimum casualties. One British writer was frank enough to admit that Gujrat was won because of 'the power of superior artillery and disciplined cooperation against a more numerous, equally brave, but less coherent enemy compelled to fight on open ground'43.
In Pakistan at least at the army level the role of artillery in all our successes was not fully appreciated as well as incorporated in doctrine training and in operational methodology. Thus the concentration was on the macho image of the tankman or infantry man whereas in reality artillery had played a decisive role in many Indian failures opposite Lahore, in Chamb and at Chawinda!
Those from infantry and armour who dominated the scene were not honest enough to admit it; and thus at Barapind despite all the martial and Islamic fervour and a clear cut three to one majority in tanks, but minus artillery support of something like 4 Corps Artillery Brigade; 8 Armoured Brigade; an elite fighting outfit ,was brought to grief; failing to dislodge one regiment of Centurions supported by three infantry units, out of which one was that of a mixed composition and two of those Madrasis despised as non-martial in Pakistan!
Our soldiers were second to none in valour; but valour alone minus military talent, coup d oeil and artillery support is no guarantee of success. It was for this reason that G.G.O Number. 1277 of 1861 had laid down specifically:-'Resolved henceforward, with such few exceptions as may be rendered necessary by local considerations, there shall be no native artillery'.44
ANALYSIS OF INDIAN CASUALTIES
I came across the assertion many times while in service that 1 Corps caused enormous casualties on the Indians in Shakargarh. This assertion is not proved by facts. The toughest battles of the 1971 war were fought opposite 54 Division and the following facts do not prove that 54 Division suffered high casualties45:-
Now compare the Pakistani losses of 35 FF at Jarpal ie 64 killed,75 wounded and 12 missing46 or that of 13 Lancers which exceeded the figure of 50 casualties. Were these necessary or justified and for what purpose? Just because one feather in someone's cap was wanted. Had there been an Eftikhar leading from the front these losses may have made some sense !
The Indians suffered heavy casualties at Sulaimanke.Some 190 Killed, 196 Missing most of whom were killed or prisoners and 425 wounded.
These casualties were far heavier than those suffered by 54 Division which fought battles like those around Bara Pind Jarpal which suffered a total of some 76 Killed and 272 wounded.
AN ALTERNATIVE OPERATIONAL REMEDY
It has frequently been asserted that 1 Corps had no other alternative but to resort to a passive defence. This is a totally false assertion, if we take into account the resources available to 1 Corps vis-a-vis the Indians. 1 Corps had nine tank regiments in all as against six Indian tank regiments in Shakargarh Bulge.
Further 17 Division was not utilised at all to do anything throughout the war. In Chamb with just a slight numerical superiority and qualitative inferiority in tanks and parity in infantry General Eftikhar wrested the initiative from Indians in such a manner that by 10th December the Indians had withdrawn one battalion from 168 Brigade in the 'X Force Sector' opposite Charwa in 1 Corps area, and had placed the same brigade at few hours notice to move to Chamb in view of 23 Divisions attack at Pallanwala.
The Pakistani GHQ's strategy in Shakargarh was reactive rather than proactive, and all initiative despite numerical superiority in armour was surrendered to the Indians. A strategy involving a more offensive posture would have definitely forced the overcautious Indians to resort to the defensive.
It was here that we enter the realm of military talent.
There was no general officer in 1 Corps with the operational talent or resolution of an Eftikhar; and this in the final analysis was the singular misfortune of Pakistan's 1 Corps.
Till ceasefire five armoured regiments were kept on sentry duty in Pasrur area and were not utilised. The saying that a pessimist sees a calamity in every opportunity, can be exactly applied to 1 Corps conduct of battle in Shakargarh Bulge.
LEVEL OF STRATEGIC SUCCESS
The Indian 1 Corps Commander was able to impose his will in strategic terms on Pakistan's 1 Corps.
With a slight relative superiority in infantry (if 17 Division is included) the Indian 1 Corps commander succeeded on two counts; firstly in ensuring that Pakistan's 6 Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Division remained fixed in Shakargarh and secondly by exerting such a pressure; despite his numerical inferiority in tanks that the Pakistani GHQ was enough unnerved to pull out 11 Cavalry from Chamb on 10 December; and bring it to Pasrur (also destroying Satrah Road on the way with their steel tracks!!!!); thereby reducing the pressure that Pakistan's 23 Division was exerting on the Indians and ultimately leading to 23 Divisions withdrawal to the west bank of Tawi.
The Indian Corps Commander was not brilliant but definitely more decisive and bold; at least as compared to 1 Corps Commander opposing him. So apprehensive was this man of Pakistani offensive capability that he initially assigned four out of his nine infantry brigades and two tank regiments out of six for a defensive role. Once he realised that the Pakistani commander opposite him was not like Abrar Akhtar or Eftikhar; he mustered greater resolution and used his troops more offensively.
FRONTAL ATTACK IN MILITARY HISTORY VERSUS IMAGINATIVE USE OF TANKS IN DEFENCE
A frontal attack against an enemy who has not been neutralised by artillery fire or surprised by following a stratagem has rarely succeed.
In 1815 at New Orleans when the British Army was one of the finest armies of the world; a similar frontal attack had led to one of the most disastrous repulses in British military annals! Thus the British suffered 2037 casualties including their commanding general killed while the US defenders suffered just 61 casualties 47
It is interesting that to note that tank is such a versatile weapon system; that the worst possible tank in defence can play havoc with the best tank when it comes to firing at an advancing tank from a stationery defensive position.
During the battle of 'Crusader' in November 1941 the British 22nd Armoured Brigade equipped with the technically overwhemingly superior 'Crusader' Tanks with 2 Pounder gun and 49mm frontal armour lost 40 out of 160 tanks when it gallantly but frontally charged the far inferior Italian Ariete Division equipped with M-13 tanks!
Most of the tanks were destroyed by anti-tank guns which were closely integrated with Italian tanks!
In July 1944 SS Obersturmfuehrer Michael Wittman was able to stop the British 7th Armoured Division with just four Tiger Tanks, annihilating their complete advance guard, knocking out 25 tanks, 14 carriers and 14 half tracks! Wittman did so without charging, but by conducting a highly imaginative defensive battle !
WHAT IS WRONG WITH PAKISTAN ARMYS TANK CORPS
Extract from my article Handling of Armour in Indo Pak wars published in Defence Journal
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/oct/handling.htm
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/aug/corps.htm
Notes
1 Page-199-Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Lahore-1973.
2 Page-188-The Pakistan Army-1966-1971-Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired)-Wajid Alis Limited-Lahore-1990.
3 I had the privilege of serving in 15 SP in its 'R' Battery which was one of the units of 8 Independent Armoured Brigade, under Major Zohrab,one of the most upright officers that I came across in the army, from 9 August 1984 to 10th October 1984 in Kharian as well as Dhamtal-Qila Sobha Singh area,at a time when war was imminent, and thus was able to interview many gunners who had taken part in the Barapind Battle.15 SP in 1984 was still equipped with Priest Self Propelled Guns of WW Two vintage,which it had at the time of Battle of Barapind.In 1984 these guns although extremely efficiently handled were at the last leg of their life,and this in itself was a direct tribute to 15 SPs excellence as a unit.
4 Most Pakistani authors while discussing 1 Corps operations conveniently omit mentioning 6 Armoured Division.This includes General Shaukat Riza who wrote the officially sponsored history of the 1971 war.Shaukat did not mention at all in his book that the 6 Armoured Division was also in I Corps area of operations around a place called Pasrur and gave no reason why this division was condemned to stationary guard duty throughout the war! Unfortunately instead of dispassionately analysing our previous wars,there has been a marked tendency in our country,that motivates military historians to rationalise all our failures by citing the excuse that we were outnumbered and all the battles where our military commanders blundered were ones in which defeat or failure was inevitable.
5 Page-199-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit.
6 Page-190-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
7 Page-191-Ibid.
8 Page-190-Ibid.
10 A lazy second line para military force which performs sentry duty at various ordnance factories. Thus in planning terms Pakistan's numerical superiority and technical parity in armour by virtue of 6 Armoured Division and the considerable infantry resources of 17 Division although available were assigned no role in the area of operations.Why this was done has not been touched at all by Shaukat Riza and Gul Hassan in their otherwise lengthy accounts?
11 Page-29-The Western Front-Lt Gen K.P Candeth (Retired)-Allied Publishers-New Delhi-1984.
12 Page-495-The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1941-1971-Maj Gen Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi-1993.
13 Page-65-Candeth-Op Cit and page-495-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. This led to despatch of 33 Infantry Brigade of 39 Division to Poonch on 21 November,since the Pakistani build up opposite Poonch had started from November.
14 Page-213-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit and page-195-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit and Page-72-The Battle of Chamb-Lt Col Saeed-Army Education Press-GHQ-Rawalpindi-1979.
15 The assertion by many eminent personalities in Pakistan Armoured Corps in particular that the Indians got two nights to consolidate their position before 8 Armoured Brigade attacked it on the morning of 16 December 1971 has no conection with facts,and is merely a figment of these honourable gentlemen's cavalier imagination! General Jahangir Karamat who was one of the squadron commanders in 13 Lancers at Barapind admitted that 'At 0430 hours on 16th December the infantry formation in defence informed the armoured brigade headquarters that the enemy had breached the minefield at Basantar Nala at Lagwal' (Page-3- 'The Tank Attack that Failed'- Brigadier Jahangir Karamat- Sabre and Lance Magazine-1982 Issue-School of Armour Nowshera-1983.
16 Page-511-Indian Army after Independence-Major K.C Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-1987.This was Lieutenant Colonel V.Ghai of 16 Madras.The three infantry battalions of this brigade were 3 Grenadiers,6 Madras and 16 Madras).
17 Page-510-Ibid.
18 Page-504-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.
18a Ibid and Page-513-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.Authors Note;-The Jat Sikhs of Hissar were an extremely tough lot famous for rowdiness and riotous habits.This was noted by an ICS officer Badruddin Tayyabji who served in Hissar before partition.The Jat Sikhs of Sisana and surrounding villages were famous before partition for distilling 'illicit home made liqour also known as Desi'.This created a close bond between them and many Ranghar Muslims of the same district!After partition many Ranghar Muslims of Sisana settled in Multan,Khanewal and Vihari districts and continue to brew excellent Desi with a far superior impact than any western brand, as per the 'Sisana' recipee!I have been always curious to know whether Sisana is still famous for the Desi which many old Ranghar armoured corps soldiers of Hissar used to nostalgically remember long after partition!
18bIbid.
18c Ibid.
19 Page-2-'Sabre and Lance' Issue-1982-Op Cit .
20 Page-215-Fazal Muqeem Khan.Late Major General Abdullah Saeed described 1 Corps Headquarters in 1971 as a headquarter struck by inertia and a paralysis.It is impossible to substantiate this assertion,but a dispassionate analysis of the 1 Corps battle proves that decisiveness,resolution or energy in conduct of operations were certainly not the hallmarks of 1 Corps Commander's personality.
21 Page-3-'Sabre and Lance'-Op Cit.
22 Ibid.
23 Page-194-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
24 Ibid.
25 A Role in which tanks occupy hides covering the most likely enemy tank approaches.from these the tanks move to pre arranged and possibly pre prepared fire positions with the aim of halting the enemy attack which has penetrated in between localities or overrun them' (Refers-GSP-1518-Armoured Regiment in Battle-1972).The Glossary of Military Terms GSP-1538 of 1973 defined counter penetration as 'The action taken by a defender to halt penetration of his defences by the enemy and to destroy by fire enemy forces which have penetrated between his defended localities'.
26 Page-194 & 195-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit and Page-3-'Sabre and Lance'-Op Cit.General Jahangir Karamat specifically stated that the CO of 13 Lancers stated the number of enemy tanks to be not more than 'six or seven'.Thus there is a discrepancy here in between Shaukat Riza and Jahangir's account.
27 Page-3-Sabre and Lance-Op Cit.
28 Page-4-Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Page-507-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.It may be noted that 13 Lancers was never ordered to capture the 'Carthage or Rome' that Barapind was but to go into counter penetration opposite Jarpal.This undue emphasis on the glory of capturing villages with mud houses or stating that they were never driven out is a good indicator of the extreme myopicness of the Indo-Pak military mind!The Kargil episode with both sides making claims of retaining or capturing Tiger Hill etc proves that despite all the NDCs and AFWCs the emphasis still is on tactical gains rather than at anything more significant.
31 Page-506-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.The Indian Armoured Corps historian praised 13 Lancers gallantry mentioning in particular Major Nisar (actually Major Nasir later Brigadier Khwaja Mohammad Nasir or Pervez Nasir).The 13 Lancers did extremely well what they were told to do as far as their squadron commanders and all lower echelons were concerned.Posterity will remember the services of all who participated in that grim battle from major and downwards.
31a Page-514-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.
32 Page-507-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.
33 Page-4-Sabre and Lance-Op Cit.
34 Page-4-Ibid.
35 Page-196-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
36 Page-196-Ibid.
37 Page-508 and 509-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.
38 Page-215 and 216-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit.
39 Page-188-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
40 Page-194-Ibid.
41 Brigadier Ahmad was described by most armoured corps officers as one of the finest and most competent officers of the armoured corps.
41a Nasir was conspicuous in being praised by both Gurcharan Singh and K.C Praval (refers-page513-K.C Praval-op cit and page-506-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit).I think the only Major at least from armoured corps,so openly and frankly praised by the Indians for leading his squadron from the front .It's a pity that he never became a major general!
42 Page-194-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
43 Page-148-The Punjab in Peace and War-S.S Thorburn-1904-London
44 Page-20-The History of the Indian Mountain Artillery-Brig Gen C.A.L Graham-Aldershot-Gale and Polden-1957.
45 Based on K.C Praval and Candeths books-Op Cit.
46 Page-197-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
47 Page-3-The Birth of the Modern World Society-1815-1830-Paul Johnson-Harper Collins-New York-1991.The exact casualties were:-British:-291 killed and remaining missing/wounded;US:-13 Killed,29 Wounded and 19 Missing.
48 Page-135 and 136-Tank Commanders-George Forty-Firebird Books-UK-1993.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/92399986/Testimonials-Recommendations-and-PublicationsMaj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN
Major Agha.H.Amin (Retired)
http://www.scribd.com/doc/83916444/Agha-H-Amin-Publications
Inspiration to write this article.
Preliminary note on relative magnitude of Bara Pind as far as casualties inflicted on the enemy were concerned
The Indians suffered heavy casualties at Sulaimanke.Some 190 Killed, 196 Missing most of whom were killed or prisoners and 425 wounded.
These casualties were far heavier than those suffered by 54 Division which fought battles like those around Bara Pind Jarpal which suffered a total of some 76 Killed and 272 wounded.
So Bara Pind was a much smaller affair than Sulaimanke.
It is only sheer Pakistani incompetence that makes BARA PIND JARPAL famous.
And what happened after the war ?
Major General Abdul Ali Malik noted to be incompetent in launching counter attacks by Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan in his officially sponsored book Pakistans Crisis in Leadership was promoted to three star while Ameer Hamza commanding at Sulaimanke was packed off as a two star .
This was because Ameer Hamza being a Baloch from DG Khan did not have the old boy network from Pindi Division required under Tikka Khan to get promoted.War performance was not important.
Brigadier Rahimuddin who had avoided military action on pretext of conducting Sheikh Mujeebs trial from 111 Brigade in Chamb was promoted and became a four star.
Such were Pakistans strategic distortions that this same Rahimuddin was governor of Balochistan and also commanding Pakistans strategic reserve 2 Corps some 700 km away from his location just because he was the illegitimate usurper zias sons father in law.Pakistan Army is comical and full of contradictions !
Another brigade commander in Chamb who General Eftikhar wanted to sack for cowardice became a three star because his village was near Tikka khans and both had good relations.
This lopsided system of promotions is discussed in detail in the article on the link below---
http://pakistan-army-interviews.blogspot.com/2010/12/assessmentmilitary-training-and.html
I saw many of the leading characters some years earlier.Commander 1 Corp Gen Irshaads son was a class fellow at Quetta in 1968.Irshaad commanded 16 Division where my father served as GSO 2 from 1969 to 1971 with generals Sharif, A.B Awan and Nazar Hussain Shah.
Brigadier Ahmad was a family friend and was a dashing young colonel driving a sports car in Quetta, famous for his 1965 war action in 25 Cavalry at Gadgor.Brigadier Ahmad was a very close friend of an uncle . A chronic bachelor he had got married around 1970 or so.
In 1977 we had a house on Asad Jan Road and somewhere in 1978 a road in CMA colony was named after one Lieutenant Pervez Aslam who was killed in action in this battle.Crossing this road with his name caption daily on way to Forman Christian College every day reminded me of Bara Pind.Our only knowledge of this battle in 1972 was that uncle Ahmad had not got promoted because of Bara Pind.
I had asked Brigadier Afzal from the tank corps who lived nearby on Shami Road about Pervez Aslam and he had recollected Bara Pind.
Somehow in a short area of 2 km by 2 km nearly many famous personalities of that time as far as the army was concerned lived, starting from Major General Nasir of Valtoha fame , Brigadier Qayyum Sher who launched the finest counter attack of 1965 war, Brigadier Shami , Brigadier Ishtiaq AC,Brigadier Habib Akbar , Brigadier Riazul Karim MC , Lieutenant General Altaf Qadir,Lieutenant General Aftab,Major General Nawazish Ali who had sacked Zia in Jordan and had gauged him as a man not fit to be an officer,Attiqur Rahman,Khalid Karak and so many others.
I was intrigued by this battle as I was commissioned in 11 Cavalry in the same outfit i.e 8 Independent Armoured Brigade. Bara Pind was a heavy name and known well but rarely discussed.
The silence was finally breaken by Brigadier Jahangir Karamat with his ground breaking article in Sabre and Lance in 1983-84.I think this remains one of the most balanced articles on the battle . But that is what Jahangir Karamat is known for.Intellectually I think one of the most outstanding army chiefs.
I served in exactly the same area in September-December 1984 when the 8 Brigade was mobilised in same area and when war was imminent.
Technically our tanks were in real bad shape and had war broken out things would have been real bad.
We did recce of the entire area in anticipation of war.Those dark rakhs were weird and there was something really heavy in them psychologically.We walked in the evening around those rakhs and there was something mysterious.
It was grim to imagine what happened to those tankists in December 1971.
It was assasination of Durga Devi by her indomitable Sikh bodyguards that prevented war that November.
When we visited Bara Pind on recce the villagers still remembered that bloody day , it was not far back , some 13 years.
In 1983 in an article in Sabre and Lance Brigadier Jahangir Karamat had already cleared some of the myths of this battle and this had historiacl value as he had participated in that battle.
Brigadier Rao Abid Hameed our brigade commander again originally from Kanar or Kalanaur had made Jahangir Karamat article on Bara Pind compulsory reading for all officers.In his characteristic way he had asked all officers of the brigade to personally give him their comments on the article.
Brigadier Rao Abid Hameed our brigade commander in Pasrur in 1984
A large part of Ranghars were from the village where my great grandfather was allotted land in Lyallpur in 1898.These Ranghars were originally from villages like Kalanauar and Kanar which had provided the nucleus to all Hindu Maratha pre 1803 and all British Cavalry units from 1775. Many 13 Lancers Ranghars were from this village too .
In one of the pictures below in handshake with VCOAS is then Captain Kanwar Javed Shabbir one of the Ranghars from the same village in Lyallpur.The village produced more than three cavalry regiments strength in pre partition India.
The famous triple layer minefield in Shakargarh Bulge was laid by 6 Engineer Battalion commanded by my father in November 1971.
One of the officers killed at Bara Pind was brother of my regimental officer then Major Faruq Yaqub Malik. 11 Cavalry had wisely kept their newly commissioned officers in adm area in Chamb as they knew nothing about tanks not having donrbasic courses.
13 Lancers did not do this .
Interestingly after having had a serious confrontation with my commanding officer who I had disobeyed things reached such a pass that I was attached to 15 SP , a very fine artillery unit.I was in the Romeo Battery with an outstanding and most upright man Major Zohrab.This explains why Zohrab did not go ahead in this army.
Fate had it that I was charge sheeted and produced before Brigadier Rao Abid Hameed on 9 August 1984 who heard the charge of disobedience , returned my belt and attached me to 15 SP Field Regiment.Thus my sojourn with an SP regiment from 9 August 1984 to early October 1984.I think 15 SP was one of the finest regiments of this army.The main reason as I saw was its commanding officer Colonel Afsar Gulji.On the whole I may say that SP units were better since they were half artillery and half armour by virtue of constant interaction with armour.This explains the personality of General Musharraf also who was an SP gunner.
I received Khan Tahir Javed from 70th Long Course on his commissioning from PMA.He was my room mate for sometime.I found him to be an outstanding professional and we stayed in touch later on too.He taught me how to make a fire support plan while I was serving in School of Armour Nowsheras Tactical Wing in 1991.He was real general material , although real general material rarely becomes a general in this darbari , hazoor ka iqbal buland karnay wali sub continental army.
In 15 SP I heard the artillery perspective of the story.How artillery was totally not utilised in the 8 Armoured Brigade counter attack.
I had moved with 15 SP when the brigade was mobilised for war on 15 September 1984.
15 SP was commanded by an outstanding gunner officer Afsar Gulji.I think he gave me greater solidarity as a commanding officer than any armour officer would have.
Later I had requested Brigadier Rao Abid Hameed to attach me to a tank regiment as war was imminent.Brigadier Rao , the gentleman that he was , agreed and attached me with 29 Cavalry another regiment of the brigade.
In the 29 Cavalry the second in command Major Idris was old 27 Cavalry and recollected his experiences of the Bara Pind battle of 1971.
Colonel Gauhar posted me to B Squadron but Azam Niazi commanding C Squadron who I regarded as a friend connvinced me that I must join C Squadron.So I requested Colonel Gauhar who agreed.
Captain Azam Niazi gave me great support and solidarity in Qila Sobha Singh area and we became very good friends.
The time from July 1984 to November 1984 was a dark period in my life and this led to my greater concentration on understanding tank warfare so as to divert my attention from my deep crises.
However providence sent unexpected friends in shape of Colonel Haider Ali Durrani who presided the court of inquiry alongwith Major Zohrab of 15 SP.
I was helped by strangers who were not my regimental officers but gunners , army service corps and from 29 Cavalry.I was impressed with 11 Cavalrys Ranghar Risladar Major who disagreed with my old commanding officers orders that the quarter guard should not salute me when I drove across the 11 Cavalry quarter guard on my way to 15 SP.It was a trying time adjusting with an SP Field regiment and with 29 Cavalry when war seemed imminent and our life abruptly cut short with a war which was forced on us.
I remember the day when Durga Devi was polished off by her Sikh guards.When I drove back to 29 Cavalry in my Volkswagon Beetle the whole 8 Independent Armoured Brigade was out in the Degh Nadi jubilantly washing their tranport and roaring with laughter while before that with the doom of war hanging heavy on us no one ventured outsided those dark Rakhs !
My personal war that began on 9th August 1984 and took me to 15 SP Field Regiment and then 29 Cavalry finally ended on 3rd November 1984 when I rejoined 11 Cavalry.My squadrons ORs were jubilant.The officers earlier avoiding me because of the previous CO also warmed up.Lieutenant Colonel Mian Liaquat Shah was a great commanding officer.He was brother of Major Mian Raza Shah from 11 Cavalry who had embraced martyrdom in Chamb in 1965.On promotion in 1983 Mian Liaquat Shah had been posted out to command 23 Cavalry.Both Liaquat Shah and myselfs joy knew no bounds on rejoining 11 Cavalry.
Fate had it that it was my good luck that an extremely upright officer Lieutenant General Shamsur Rahman Kallue was our corps commander and he agreed to my submissions in the redress of grievances against both my commanding officer and brigade commander.
Click on top to see the complete letter
General K.M Arif the VCOAS who was also then the Godfather of 11 Cavalry had most kindly agreed that my stand was right.November 1984 was a time of vindication and redress for me.Nothing gave me greater happiness than rejoining 11 Cavalry.
I rejoined 11 Cavalry around 3rd November 1984 when the old commanding officer was posted out and Lieutenant Colonel Mian Laiquat Shah , brother of Major Mian Raza Shah took over the unit.
We had our brigade major Major Naeem , also known as Naeem Phanna.Naeem was a hard task master and exhorted all to remember Bara Pind.This is what happened to us in 1971 , be professional , learn the job of fighting Naeem would say.
With dear friend mentor and my benefactor Major General Naeem after retirement
While Rao Abid Hameed the brigade commander was a thorough gentleman who forgave me for an incident where we exchanged hot words , Naeem Phanna drove the brigade hard ordering tank regiments to change their location at 30 minutes notice.It was common that we were having dinner and 5 minutes after dinner commenced an order came from Major Naeem to move the unit at 30 minutes notice.And all hell broke with us loading the tanks and moving.
All that Naeem said was load.So we loaded and were ready for move.He would then visit us after an hour and give us the next location which could be as close as a kilometre and as far away as 20 km.
Although we cursed the BM then but now we realise that this is how an outfit has to be trained for war.Today I understand that Naeem was one great professional I met in this army.
Into the Valley of Death,
Rode the 600,
Theirs not to question why
Theirs but to do and Die
The Stench of burnt human flesh many miles around
In those dark Rakhs (Forests ) of Shakar Garh Bulge
Major General Abdul Ali Malik noted to be incompetent in launching counter attacks by Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan in his officially sponsored book Pakistans Crisis in Leadership was promoted to three star while Ameer Hamza commanding at Sulaimanke was packed off as a two star .
This was because Ameer Hamza being a Baloch from DG Khan did not have the old boy network from Pindi Division required under Tikka Khan to get promoted.War performance was not important.
Brigadier Rahimuddin who had avoided military action on pretext of conducting Sheikh Mujeebs trial from 111 Brigade in Chamb was promoted and became a four star.
Such were Pakistans strategic distortions that this same Rahimuddin was governor of Balochistan and also commanding Pakistans strategic reserve 2 Corps some 700 km away from his location just because he was the illegitimate usurper zias sons father in law.Pakistan Army is comical and full of contradictions !
Another brigade commander in Chamb who General Eftikhar wanted to sack for cowardice became a three star because his village was near Tikka khans and both had good relations.
This lopsided system of promotions is discussed in detail in the article on the link below---
http://pakistan-army-interviews.blogspot.com/2010/12/assessmentmilitary-training-and.html
I saw many of the leading characters some years earlier.Commander 1 Corp Gen Irshaads son was a class fellow at Quetta in 1968.Irshaad commanded 16 Division where my father served as GSO 2 from 1969 to 1971 with generals Sharif, A.B Awan and Nazar Hussain Shah.
Brigadier Ahmad was a family friend and was a dashing young colonel driving a sports car in Quetta, famous for his 1965 war action in 25 Cavalry at Gadgor.Brigadier Ahmad was a very close friend of an uncle . A chronic bachelor he had got married around 1970 or so.
In 1977 we had a house on Asad Jan Road and somewhere in 1978 a road in CMA colony was named after one Lieutenant Pervez Aslam who was killed in action in this battle.Crossing this road with his name caption daily on way to Forman Christian College every day reminded me of Bara Pind.Our only knowledge of this battle in 1972 was that uncle Ahmad had not got promoted because of Bara Pind.
I had asked Brigadier Afzal from the tank corps who lived nearby on Shami Road about Pervez Aslam and he had recollected Bara Pind.
Somehow in a short area of 2 km by 2 km nearly many famous personalities of that time as far as the army was concerned lived, starting from Major General Nasir of Valtoha fame , Brigadier Qayyum Sher who launched the finest counter attack of 1965 war, Brigadier Shami , Brigadier Ishtiaq AC,Brigadier Habib Akbar , Brigadier Riazul Karim MC , Lieutenant General Altaf Qadir,Lieutenant General Aftab,Major General Nawazish Ali who had sacked Zia in Jordan and had gauged him as a man not fit to be an officer,Attiqur Rahman,Khalid Karak and so many others.
I was intrigued by this battle as I was commissioned in 11 Cavalry in the same outfit i.e 8 Independent Armoured Brigade. Bara Pind was a heavy name and known well but rarely discussed.
The silence was finally breaken by Brigadier Jahangir Karamat with his ground breaking article in Sabre and Lance in 1983-84.I think this remains one of the most balanced articles on the battle . But that is what Jahangir Karamat is known for.Intellectually I think one of the most outstanding army chiefs.
I served in exactly the same area in September-December 1984 when the 8 Brigade was mobilised in same area and when war was imminent.
Technically our tanks were in real bad shape and had war broken out things would have been real bad.
We did recce of the entire area in anticipation of war.Those dark rakhs were weird and there was something really heavy in them psychologically.We walked in the evening around those rakhs and there was something mysterious.
It was grim to imagine what happened to those tankists in December 1971.
It was assasination of Durga Devi by her indomitable Sikh bodyguards that prevented war that November.
When we visited Bara Pind on recce the villagers still remembered that bloody day , it was not far back , some 13 years.
In 1983 in an article in Sabre and Lance Brigadier Jahangir Karamat had already cleared some of the myths of this battle and this had historiacl value as he had participated in that battle.
Brigadier Rao Abid Hameed our brigade commander again originally from Kanar or Kalanaur had made Jahangir Karamat article on Bara Pind compulsory reading for all officers.In his characteristic way he had asked all officers of the brigade to personally give him their comments on the article.
A large part of Ranghars were from the village where my great grandfather was allotted land in Lyallpur in 1898.These Ranghars were originally from villages like Kalanauar and Kanar which had provided the nucleus to all Hindu Maratha pre 1803 and all British Cavalry units from 1775. Many 13 Lancers Ranghars were from this village too .
In one of the pictures below in handshake with VCOAS is then Captain Kanwar Javed Shabbir one of the Ranghars from the same village in Lyallpur.The village produced more than three cavalry regiments strength in pre partition India.
The famous triple layer minefield in Shakargarh Bulge was laid by 6 Engineer Battalion commanded by my father in November 1971.
One of the officers killed at Bara Pind was brother of my regimental officer then Major Faruq Yaqub Malik. 11 Cavalry had wisely kept their newly commissioned officers in adm area in Chamb as they knew nothing about tanks not having donrbasic courses.
13 Lancers did not do this .
Interestingly after having had a serious confrontation with my commanding officer who I had disobeyed things reached such a pass that I was attached to 15 SP , a very fine artillery unit.I was in the Romeo Battery with an outstanding and most upright man Major Zohrab.This explains why Zohrab did not go ahead in this army.
Fate had it that I was charge sheeted and produced before Brigadier Rao Abid Hameed on 9 August 1984 who heard the charge of disobedience , returned my belt and attached me to 15 SP Field Regiment.Thus my sojourn with an SP regiment from 9 August 1984 to early October 1984.I think 15 SP was one of the finest regiments of this army.The main reason as I saw was its commanding officer Colonel Afsar Gulji.On the whole I may say that SP units were better since they were half artillery and half armour by virtue of constant interaction with armour.This explains the personality of General Musharraf also who was an SP gunner.
I received Khan Tahir Javed from 70th Long Course on his commissioning from PMA.He was my room mate for sometime.I found him to be an outstanding professional and we stayed in touch later on too.He taught me how to make a fire support plan while I was serving in School of Armour Nowsheras Tactical Wing in 1991.He was real general material , although real general material rarely becomes a general in this darbari , hazoor ka iqbal buland karnay wali sub continental army.
In 15 SP I heard the artillery perspective of the story.How artillery was totally not utilised in the 8 Armoured Brigade counter attack.
I had moved with 15 SP when the brigade was mobilised for war on 15 September 1984.
15 SP was commanded by an outstanding gunner officer Afsar Gulji.I think he gave me greater solidarity as a commanding officer than any armour officer would have.
Later I had requested Brigadier Rao Abid Hameed to attach me to a tank regiment as war was imminent.Brigadier Rao , the gentleman that he was , agreed and attached me with 29 Cavalry another regiment of the brigade.
In the 29 Cavalry the second in command Major Idris was old 27 Cavalry and recollected his experiences of the Bara Pind battle of 1971.
Colonel Gauhar posted me to B Squadron but Azam Niazi commanding C Squadron who I regarded as a friend connvinced me that I must join C Squadron.So I requested Colonel Gauhar who agreed.
Captain Azam Niazi gave me great support and solidarity in Qila Sobha Singh area and we became very good friends.
 |
| With Major Azam Niazi my squadron commander in 29 Cavalry in October 1984 in 2010 |
The time from July 1984 to November 1984 was a dark period in my life and this led to my greater concentration on understanding tank warfare so as to divert my attention from my deep crises.
However providence sent unexpected friends in shape of Colonel Haider Ali Durrani who presided the court of inquiry alongwith Major Zohrab of 15 SP.
I was helped by strangers who were not my regimental officers but gunners , army service corps and from 29 Cavalry.I was impressed with 11 Cavalrys Ranghar Risladar Major who disagreed with my old commanding officers orders that the quarter guard should not salute me when I drove across the 11 Cavalry quarter guard on my way to 15 SP.It was a trying time adjusting with an SP Field regiment and with 29 Cavalry when war seemed imminent and our life abruptly cut short with a war which was forced on us.
I remember the day when Durga Devi was polished off by her Sikh guards.When I drove back to 29 Cavalry in my Volkswagon Beetle the whole 8 Independent Armoured Brigade was out in the Degh Nadi jubilantly washing their tranport and roaring with laughter while before that with the doom of war hanging heavy on us no one ventured outsided those dark Rakhs !
My personal war that began on 9th August 1984 and took me to 15 SP Field Regiment and then 29 Cavalry finally ended on 3rd November 1984 when I rejoined 11 Cavalry.My squadrons ORs were jubilant.The officers earlier avoiding me because of the previous CO also warmed up.Lieutenant Colonel Mian Liaquat Shah was a great commanding officer.He was brother of Major Mian Raza Shah from 11 Cavalry who had embraced martyrdom in Chamb in 1965.On promotion in 1983 Mian Liaquat Shah had been posted out to command 23 Cavalry.Both Liaquat Shah and myselfs joy knew no bounds on rejoining 11 Cavalry.
Fate had it that it was my good luck that an extremely upright officer Lieutenant General Shamsur Rahman Kallue was our corps commander and he agreed to my submissions in the redress of grievances against both my commanding officer and brigade commander.
Click on top to see the complete letter
General K.M Arif the VCOAS who was also then the Godfather of 11 Cavalry had most kindly agreed that my stand was right.November 1984 was a time of vindication and redress for me.Nothing gave me greater happiness than rejoining 11 Cavalry.
I rejoined 11 Cavalry around 3rd November 1984 when the old commanding officer was posted out and Lieutenant Colonel Mian Laiquat Shah , brother of Major Mian Raza Shah took over the unit.
We had our brigade major Major Naeem , also known as Naeem Phanna.Naeem was a hard task master and exhorted all to remember Bara Pind.This is what happened to us in 1971 , be professional , learn the job of fighting Naeem would say.
With dear friend mentor and my benefactor Major General Naeem after retirement
While Rao Abid Hameed the brigade commander was a thorough gentleman who forgave me for an incident where we exchanged hot words , Naeem Phanna drove the brigade hard ordering tank regiments to change their location at 30 minutes notice.It was common that we were having dinner and 5 minutes after dinner commenced an order came from Major Naeem to move the unit at 30 minutes notice.And all hell broke with us loading the tanks and moving.
All that Naeem said was load.So we loaded and were ready for move.He would then visit us after an hour and give us the next location which could be as close as a kilometre and as far away as 20 km.
Although we cursed the BM then but now we realise that this is how an outfit has to be trained for war.Today I understand that Naeem was one great professional I met in this army.
Into the Valley of Death,
Rode the 600,
Theirs not to question why
Theirs but to do and Die
The Stench of burnt human flesh many miles around
In those dark Rakhs (Forests ) of Shakar Garh Bulge
Agha H Amin
11 Cavalry tanks move out of the Rakhs to move back to Kharian after de-escalation. 1 December 1984
C Squadron 11 Cavalry was located at Kamal Rakh on Degh Nala for few days
11 Cavalry reaches Kharian in December 1984.
My Tank in Kamala Rakh with Troop Daffadar Khursheed November 1984
General K.M Arif visits his parent regiment 11 Cavalry near Pasrur after de-escalation
In order to understand the strategic and operational background read the following also :---
http://pakistan-army-interviews.blogspot.com/2010/11/1971-war-in-west-pakistan-strategic-and.html
http://pakistan-army-interviews.blogspot.com/2010/11/pakistan-army-from-1965-to-1971.html
A Story of the miserable Command Failure of Pakistans 1 Corps led by Lieutenant General Irshaad,8 Infantry Division led by Major General Abdul Ali Malik and 8 Independent Armoured Brigade at Bara Pind in 1971 War.
Valuable human lives sent into certain and pointless slaughter simply because of poor leadership and planning.
In the Memory of all who participated in that bloody tank battle
Major Agha H Amin (Tank Corps-Pavo Cavalry)
Second Lieutenant Yaqub Malik ,Troop Leader 13 Lancers , brother of Brigadier Faruq Yaqub (11 Pavo Cavalry) and son of Lieut Colonel Yaqub Malik (Pavo Cavalry) killed in action at Bara Pind
Photograph taken by the author in December 1984 in his parent regiment 11 Cavalry in 8 Independent Armoured Brigade near Kamala Rakh some miles from Bara Pind , in order to illustrate how a tank looked like while moving and how wasy it was for a defender in the Rakh (reserve forest) in the background to hit tanks (unless neutralised by artillery fire).In November 1984 Pakistan was very close to war , averted only thanks to assasination of Durga Devi by her Sikh guards ! 1984 was the worse time for Pakistan for war because of pathetic technical condition of tanks !
Second Lieutenant Qaiser Nazeer Qureshi ,13 Lancers,Killed in action on 16 December1971
Captain Ejaz Alam of 13 Lancers (brother of Brig Z.A Khan,Vice Admiral Shamoon Alam,General Shamim Alam,Lieutenant General Javed Alam,Lt Col Feroz Alam,Group Captain Mushtaq Alam,Group Captain Shuaib Alam ) killed in action at Bara Pind
Lieutenant Zafar Ali Akbar , 13 Lancers,killed in action on 16 December 1971
Lieutenant Pervaiz Aslam,13 Lancers , killed in action on 16 December 1971
Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal a Punjabi Hindu from Sargodha District who played a key role in saving Indian position at Bara Pind.Killed in action and awarded PVC the highest military Award of India.Sargodha till ,in 1980s included Khushab also so I am not sure if he is Khushab or Sargodha.A Punjabi Hindu diplomat I met in Afghanistan who was from Mitha Tiwana told me that Khetarpal most probably was from Khushab but this needs to be confirmed.
Major Alley Ahmad ,Tank Squadron of 31 Cavalry Killed in action at Bara Pind
Lieutenant Zaheed Rashid Mirza of 31 Cavalry, tank troop leader,killed in action at Bara Pind
Into the Valley of Death,
Rode the 600,
Theirs not to question why
Theirs but to do and Die
The Stench of burnt human flesh many miles around
In those dark Rakhs (Forests ) of Shakar Garh Bulge
A DESTROYED PAKISTANI M 48 TANK AT BARA PIND
 |
Second Lieutenant Qaiser Nazeer Qureshi ,13 Lancers,Killed in action on 16 December1971
Captain Ejaz Alam of 13 Lancers (brother of Brig Z.A Khan,Vice Admiral Shamoon Alam,General Shamim Alam,Lieutenant General Javed Alam,Lt Col Feroz Alam,Group Captain Mushtaq Alam,Group Captain Shuaib Alam ) killed in action at Bara Pind
Lieutenant Zafar Ali Akbar , 13 Lancers,killed in action on 16 December 1971
Lieutenant Pervaiz Aslam,13 Lancers , killed in action on 16 December 1971
Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal a Punjabi Hindu from Sargodha District who played a key role in saving Indian position at Bara Pind.Killed in action and awarded PVC the highest military Award of India.Sargodha till ,in 1980s included Khushab also so I am not sure if he is Khushab or Sargodha.A Punjabi Hindu diplomat I met in Afghanistan who was from Mitha Tiwana told me that Khetarpal most probably was from Khushab but this needs to be confirmed.
Major Alley Ahmad ,Tank Squadron of 31 Cavalry Killed in action at Bara Pind
Lieutenant Zaheed Rashid Mirza of 31 Cavalry, tank troop leader,killed in action at Bara Pind
Into the Valley of Death,
Rode the 600,
Theirs not to question why
Theirs but to do and Die
The Stench of burnt human flesh many miles around
In those dark Rakhs (Forests ) of Shakar Garh Bulge
A DESTROYED PAKISTANI M 48 TANK AT BARA PIND
INDIAN SOLDIERS STANDING ONE OF THE DESTROYED PATTON TANKS OF 13 LANCERS IN THE BATTLE
THIS IS NOT SOMETHING COPY AND PASTE BUT BASED ON ENTIRELY ORIGINAL RESEARCH OF MAJOR A.H AMIN FROM 1983 TO 1999 AND ONE OF THE CHAPTERS OF :--
"INDO PAK WARS-A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS-1947-71" BY MAJOR A.H AMIN"
WHICH CAN BE FOUND IN MANY LEADING MILITARY LIBRARIES OF THE WORLD.I HAD CONSIDERED A WASTE OF TIME AND VALUABLE EFFORT TO SEND IT TO ANY PEDANTIC PAKISTANI LIBRARY OR PAKISTANI MILITARY INSTITUTION,WHICH ARE BASTIONS OF PEDANTRY AND MYOPIC LEARNING.
IT IS BECAUSE OF NOT POINTING WITH STRESS SUCH MISERABLE COMMAND FAILURES THAT WE CANNOT FORGIVE RECENT HISTORIANS LIKE SHUJA NAWAZ THE AUTHOR OF CROSSED SWORDS--BOOK REVIEW OF CROSSED SWORDS MAY BE READ IN THE BLOG ON BOOKS ON THE FOLLOWING LINK:--
IT IS BECAUSE OF NOT POINTING WITH STRESS SUCH MISERABLE COMMAND FAILURES THAT WE CANNOT FORGIVE RECENT HISTORIANS LIKE SHUJA NAWAZ THE AUTHOR OF CROSSED SWORDS--BOOK REVIEW OF CROSSED SWORDS MAY BE READ IN THE BLOG ON BOOKS ON THE FOLLOWING LINK:--
Battle of Barapind-Jarpal
16 Dec 1971
A.H Amin
September 1999
The Battle of Barapind or Jarpal, fought on the northern border of the ShakarGarh Bulge, as the Pakistanis and Indians respectively call it, was one of the most bloody and pointless battles of the 1971 war as far as the Western Front was concerned. The battle has remained shrouded in a number of myths and controversies with one unit accusing another of cowardice and misreporting, further compounded by the artillery accusing armour as an arm and armour in turn blaming the infantry for all its tactical blunders!
Around the 1980s some gentlemen particularly in the armoured corps rationalised the battle and the immense losses in men and material by claiming that had the counterattack not been launched, the Indians would have broken through and may have perhaps captured Zafarwal or Pasrur. Another school of thought in the armoured corps heaped the entire blame on the armoured brigade commander, while totally denying that the Barapind-Jarpal fiasco had any connection with faulty doctrine, organisational imbalances/deficiencies, battle procedure or with the command echelons higher than brigade level!
Many rationalised the failure by insisting that the Indians enjoyed numerical superiority and the losses suffered by the armoured brigade were inevitable. Yet another school of thought, particularly in the armoured corps alleged that the fiasco occurred because of misreporting of enemy situation by an infantry battalion!We will briefly analyse the battle and endeavour to arrive at conclusions which are realistic and free from negative biases like inter arm rivalry, personal likes and dislikes and a mistaken feeling of espirit de corps which propels many to regard forthright analysis as against regimental loyalty or as unpatriotic etc.
COMPARISON OF FORCES
Pakistan's I Corps (Lieutenant General Irshad Ahmad Khan) consisted of three infantry divisions, an armoured division and an armoured brigade. Two of its infantry divisions were deployed to defend the entire area from Marala Headworks in the north till the Narowal area where the Ravi river finally enters Pakistan.
8 Infantry Division (Major Abdul Ali Malik)1 comprising four infantry brigades2 being responsible for defence of Shakargarh Bulge and 15 Division (Major General Abid Ali Zahid) for the defence of Sialkot.
8 Independent Armoured Brigade (Brigadier Syed Mohammad Ahmad) comprising three tank regiments (13 Lancers, 27 Cavalry and 31 Cavalry), one self-propelled artillery regiment (15 Self- Propelled Regiment or simply 15 SP)3 and a mechanised infantry battalion (29 Frontier Force or simply 29 FF) was to assist both 8 and 15 Division in the defence of the Ravi-Chenab corridor by launching counterattacks or occupying counter penetration positions.
6 Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Division although theoretically under command 1 Corps were essentially the Pakistan Army's strategic reserve and were in concentration areas in general area Pasrur-Daska-Gujranwala. These were to be employed only as a last resort and as a matter of fact were not employed at all by the GHQ because of lack of resolution!
India's I Corps comprised three infantry divisions (36, 39 and 54 Divisions), two armoured brigades (2 and 16 Independent Armoured Brigades), two independent artillery brigades (31 and 41) less a medium regiment and approximately two engineer brigades. The Indian infantry divisions did not have any integral tank regiments.
The independent artillery brigades were equivalent to what the Pakistanis called corps artillery, subdivided into two brigades for greater flexibility, keeping in view the large frontage of the area of operations. The infantry divisions however had their own respective divisional artillery brigades. The Indians enjoyed a significant, although not overwhelming superiority in infantry, having approximately 27 infantry battalions as against 8 Divisions 12 infantry battalions. I have used the word significant because the 17 Division although never employed by Pakistan was also available, at least potentially for use.
In armour the Indians enjoyed qualitative but not quantitative superiority as was later fallaciously claimed by some in order to rationalise the blunders committed by Pakistan's I Corps. They had six tank regiments and two independent recce squadrons as against five tank regiments and one independent squadron of 8 Division and 8 Independent Armoured Brigade and four tank regiments of 6 Armoured Division4.
It may be noted that 6 Armoured Division was reinforced by 11 Cavalry by the time the Barapind battle was fought and thus the total Pakistani potential tank strength which could be employed against the Indian I Corps (minus 15 Division, which was opposite Indian 15 Corps 26 Division) was nine tank regiments as against six Indian.
The Indian qualitative superiority in tanks was also not applicable as far as Barapind-Jarpal battle was concerned.This was so because all the T-54/T-55 Indian tanks were concentrated in its 2 Armoured Brigade whose all three units were equipped with T series tanks, while the 16 Independent Armoured Brigade, which fought the Barapind Battle was equipped with the same Centurions which the Indians had in 1965 as against the same Pattons of Pakistan's 8 Armoured Brigade, which Pakistan had in 1965 war.
The 6 Armoured Division was equipped with T-59 tanks which were at par with the Indian T-54/T-55 tanks and far superior to Centurions.
AREA OF OPERATIONS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
The Shakargarh Bulge by virtue of its location parallel to the only Indian road link to Kashmir for more than 54 miles was an area which the Indians could not ignore. Any Pakistani thrust launched from the bulge into Kashmir at any point along the entire 54 miles stretch from Kathua to Jammu could enable the Pakistan Army to sever the road link between India and Kashmir by advancing just five to fifteen miles inside Indian territory!
This would have meant isolation of five infantry divisions; something which could have affected the whole outcome of war! It was for this reason that the Indians had selected the northwestern part of Shakargarh Bulge to launch their main attack in 1965.Shakargarh was not as vital for Pakistan as for India, being one of the few areas north of Sutlej river where Pakistan could afford to trade space for time, at worst and launch a major thrust inside Indian territory to force the Indians to commit their reserves and even ease the pressure on the East wing, at best. It was a potential springboard for launching a significant thrust inside India, which had the ability to seriously limit Indian Army's freedom of manoeuvre, provided there was a Moltke or Manstein in the Pakistani GHQ! While having all the advantages of a springboard for offensive operations, Shakargarh was a defender's nightmare.
There were no serious water obstacles, unlike the areas south of Ravi River, to restrict the freedom of manoeuvre of a force commanded by an imaginative and resolute commander. The area was flat, firm and free of the boggy patches found in plenty in the areas west of Pasrur or south of the MRL canal and Ravi River.
The area was bisected by a large number of water courses and their tributaries (see map) running in a general north east- south west direction from Indian held Kashmir into Pakistan.These were non-perennial and fordable with minor recce in winters. Fields of fire were limited between 600 to 1200 yards due to clumps villages and sugar cane crops and artificial plantations called 'Rakhs' or 'Reserve Forest'. The Pakistanis had constructed a number of embankments (bunds) and anti- tank ditches to restrict an attacker's freedom of manoeuvre.
These obstacles were further strengthened by construction of concrete bunkers. In addition three lines of mines, each approximately 600 to 800 metres were laid before the commencement of the war.
OPPOSING PLANS
PAKISTANI PLAN: -
The Pakistani plan for employment of I Corps and defence of Shakargarh was an essentially reactive rather than proactive plan. As per Fazal Muqeem the Pakistani I Corps was tasked to eliminate the Indian enclave (Dharm Enclave) on the Pakistani side of the River Ravi in area Narowal on the south western border of the Shakargarh Bulge and simulate offensive actions in order to draw enemy forces into the Shakargarh area5.
The defence was based on two strong points organised around the small towns of Shakargarh, Narowal and Zafarwal which were to be held by 14 Para Brigade and 24 Brigade respectively6. It was appreciated that the main Indian thrust would be launched in the area between Degh Nala and Bein Nala.
An ad hoc covering troops force known as the 'Changez Force' under Brigadier Nisar (of Gadgor fame in 1965 war) consisting of two tank regiments (20 Lancers, the I Corps Recce Regiment and 33 Cavalry ex 8 Division) and 13 Punjab were to fight a delaying battle at each minefield belt between the two strong points i.e. Zafarwal on the east bank of Degh Nala and Shakargarh on the west bank of Bein Nala, 'with a view to causing maximum attrition on enemy armour and infantry, thereby creating an opportunity for effective counterattack by corps/division resources'7.
One tank regiment (20 Lancers having 35 Sherman, M-36-B-2 Tanks) of this force was to delay the advancing enemy along the first minefield while the second tank regiment (33 Cavalry having 41 Patton M-47/M-48 Tanks)8 was to impose delay along the second minefield.
13 Punjab the foot infantry unit with Changez Force was to provide infantry support to the Changez Force. The road between Zafarwal and Shakargarh was designated as line of no penetration and any enemy thrust south of this line was to be eliminated by launching the corps armoured reserve i.e. 8 Independent Armoured Brigade.
The 8 Armoured Brigade was not tasked to do anything to wrest initiative from the enemy and the 6 Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Division were also assigned no offensive roles and were in MODC role (Ministry of Defence Constabulary)10.
INDIAN PLAN:-
The essence of Indian I Corps plan was to take offensive action and advance into Shakargarh Bulge from the north and east with an infantry division each spearheaded by an independent armoured brigade, with a view to ensure, the security of the Pathankot Base and also the corridor leading to Kashmir on which the 15 Indian Corps in Kashmir depended11 while also ensuring that Pakistani reserves were also committed in defence of Shakargarh Bulge and could not be used in an offensive role.
The original Indian plan, keeping in view their comparative strength, was extremely ambitious and envisaged the capture of Pasrur followed by an advance to the MRL Canal12.
This was revised following the Pakistani build up against Poonch. 197113.The modified Indian plan involved a two prong advance by 54 and 39 Infantry Divisions supported by 16 and 2 Independent Armoured Brigades respectively with 54 Division with 16 Independent Armoured Brigade under command was to advance southwards in the area between Degh and Karir Nala and capture Zafarwal-Dhamtal complex.
The 39 Division (with 72 Infantry Brigade consisting of four battalions and 2 Independent Armoured Brigade) was to advance from the north and capture Shakargarh.
The 36 Infantry Division tasked to defend the most critical Pathankot-Kathua-Gurdaspur area was to initially stay on the defensive and to attack westwards towards Shakargarh in case the operational situation warranted (ie after ensuring that no Pakistani threat was imminent against Pathankot-Kathua-Gurdaspur complex).
The Indian plan was extremely conservative. There were nine infantry brigades available to Lieutenant General K.K Singh (commander of 1 Armoured Brigade at Chawinda in 1965). He earmarked four of these (168, 323, 87 and 18) along with six tank squadrons ( complete 14 Scinde Horse and 16 Light Cavalry) for guarding the critical areas of the Indian border on both flanks against a likely Pakistani attack.
These troops were deployed west of Degh Nala (two infantry brigades and a tank regiment less one squadron), opposite Nainakot (one infantry brigade and one tank squadron) and in area Dinanagar-Pathankot (one infantry brigade and one tank regiment).
This left the Indian I Corps with four infantry brigades and two armoured brigades less one tank regiment each to advance inside Pakistani territory !
OPERATIONAL SITUATION FROM 4TH TO 16TH DECEMBER 1971
The Indians were as concerned about their security as the Pakistanis but superiority in infantry enabled them to assume an offensive role.
Their relatively limited armoured resources vis-a-vis the total available Pakistani armour in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor however ensured that although Pakistani territory all along the eastern and northern boundary of Shakargarh Bulge was captured, no major strategic gain was made.
The Indian because of the minefields (the minefields were laid by 6 Engineer Battalion just back from East Pakistan in October 1971 and commanded by the authors father from October 1971 to October 1972) and because of the skill with which Brigadier Nisar handled Changez Force was slow. Soon after the commencement of operations once they realised that no Pakistani threat was likely against Pathankot-Kathua or Samba the 36 Division was also given an offensive task on 8th December, to advance against Shakargarh from the east with an infantry brigade and a tank regiment.
39 Infantry Divisions rate of advance was extremely slow and on 12 December its only two advancing brigades i.e. 72 Brigade and the 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (less one tank regiment) were placed under command 54 Division (72 Brigade and one tank regiment) and 36 Division (2 Armoured Brigade and less two tank regiments).
In addition 87 Brigade and one tank squadron of 39 Division which were in defensive role opposite Nainakot were also placed under command 36 Division and assigned an offensive role of advancing against Shakargarh along with 36 Divisions other brigades.
39 Infantry Division Headquarters was shifted to Samba area and made responsible for commanding the three infantry brigades and one tank regiment less one squadron in holding role in 'X Sector' on the right flank of the 1 Corps between Degh and Aik Nala.
The 54 Infantry Division and 16 Armoured Brigade with whom we are primarily concerned as far as the analysis of the 'Battle of Barapind-Jarpal' is concerned advanced cautiously and slowly but enough to unnerve the Pakistan Army's Chief of Staff General Hameed who despatched one of the infantry brigades (124 Brigade) of the reserve division 33 Division to I Corps on 9th December 1971 and alerting 11 Cavalry till then in Chamb for move to Shakargarh on 10th December14.
The Pakistani defences opposite 54 Division followed an inverted 'L Shaped' alignment with a horizontal alignment along 'Sakror Bund', an anti-tank ditch and embankment which ran all the way between Degh and Basantar Nala and a vertical alignment along the west bank of Basantar Nala from a point a little north of Lalial village where the Sakror Bund joined the Basantar Nala, running in a north-south direction from this point.
16 Dec 1971
A.H Amin
September 1999
The Battle of Barapind or Jarpal, fought on the northern border of the ShakarGarh Bulge, as the Pakistanis and Indians respectively call it, was one of the most bloody and pointless battles of the 1971 war as far as the Western Front was concerned. The battle has remained shrouded in a number of myths and controversies with one unit accusing another of cowardice and misreporting, further compounded by the artillery accusing armour as an arm and armour in turn blaming the infantry for all its tactical blunders!
Around the 1980s some gentlemen particularly in the armoured corps rationalised the battle and the immense losses in men and material by claiming that had the counterattack not been launched, the Indians would have broken through and may have perhaps captured Zafarwal or Pasrur. Another school of thought in the armoured corps heaped the entire blame on the armoured brigade commander, while totally denying that the Barapind-Jarpal fiasco had any connection with faulty doctrine, organisational imbalances/deficiencies, battle procedure or with the command echelons higher than brigade level!
Many rationalised the failure by insisting that the Indians enjoyed numerical superiority and the losses suffered by the armoured brigade were inevitable. Yet another school of thought, particularly in the armoured corps alleged that the fiasco occurred because of misreporting of enemy situation by an infantry battalion!We will briefly analyse the battle and endeavour to arrive at conclusions which are realistic and free from negative biases like inter arm rivalry, personal likes and dislikes and a mistaken feeling of espirit de corps which propels many to regard forthright analysis as against regimental loyalty or as unpatriotic etc.
COMPARISON OF FORCES
Pakistan's I Corps (Lieutenant General Irshad Ahmad Khan) consisted of three infantry divisions, an armoured division and an armoured brigade. Two of its infantry divisions were deployed to defend the entire area from Marala Headworks in the north till the Narowal area where the Ravi river finally enters Pakistan.
8 Infantry Division (Major Abdul Ali Malik)1 comprising four infantry brigades2 being responsible for defence of Shakargarh Bulge and 15 Division (Major General Abid Ali Zahid) for the defence of Sialkot.
8 Independent Armoured Brigade (Brigadier Syed Mohammad Ahmad) comprising three tank regiments (13 Lancers, 27 Cavalry and 31 Cavalry), one self-propelled artillery regiment (15 Self- Propelled Regiment or simply 15 SP)3 and a mechanised infantry battalion (29 Frontier Force or simply 29 FF) was to assist both 8 and 15 Division in the defence of the Ravi-Chenab corridor by launching counterattacks or occupying counter penetration positions.
6 Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Division although theoretically under command 1 Corps were essentially the Pakistan Army's strategic reserve and were in concentration areas in general area Pasrur-Daska-Gujranwala. These were to be employed only as a last resort and as a matter of fact were not employed at all by the GHQ because of lack of resolution!
India's I Corps comprised three infantry divisions (36, 39 and 54 Divisions), two armoured brigades (2 and 16 Independent Armoured Brigades), two independent artillery brigades (31 and 41) less a medium regiment and approximately two engineer brigades. The Indian infantry divisions did not have any integral tank regiments.
The independent artillery brigades were equivalent to what the Pakistanis called corps artillery, subdivided into two brigades for greater flexibility, keeping in view the large frontage of the area of operations. The infantry divisions however had their own respective divisional artillery brigades. The Indians enjoyed a significant, although not overwhelming superiority in infantry, having approximately 27 infantry battalions as against 8 Divisions 12 infantry battalions. I have used the word significant because the 17 Division although never employed by Pakistan was also available, at least potentially for use.
In armour the Indians enjoyed qualitative but not quantitative superiority as was later fallaciously claimed by some in order to rationalise the blunders committed by Pakistan's I Corps. They had six tank regiments and two independent recce squadrons as against five tank regiments and one independent squadron of 8 Division and 8 Independent Armoured Brigade and four tank regiments of 6 Armoured Division4.
It may be noted that 6 Armoured Division was reinforced by 11 Cavalry by the time the Barapind battle was fought and thus the total Pakistani potential tank strength which could be employed against the Indian I Corps (minus 15 Division, which was opposite Indian 15 Corps 26 Division) was nine tank regiments as against six Indian.
The Indian qualitative superiority in tanks was also not applicable as far as Barapind-Jarpal battle was concerned.This was so because all the T-54/T-55 Indian tanks were concentrated in its 2 Armoured Brigade whose all three units were equipped with T series tanks, while the 16 Independent Armoured Brigade, which fought the Barapind Battle was equipped with the same Centurions which the Indians had in 1965 as against the same Pattons of Pakistan's 8 Armoured Brigade, which Pakistan had in 1965 war.
The 6 Armoured Division was equipped with T-59 tanks which were at par with the Indian T-54/T-55 tanks and far superior to Centurions.
AREA OF OPERATIONS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
The Shakargarh Bulge by virtue of its location parallel to the only Indian road link to Kashmir for more than 54 miles was an area which the Indians could not ignore. Any Pakistani thrust launched from the bulge into Kashmir at any point along the entire 54 miles stretch from Kathua to Jammu could enable the Pakistan Army to sever the road link between India and Kashmir by advancing just five to fifteen miles inside Indian territory!
This would have meant isolation of five infantry divisions; something which could have affected the whole outcome of war! It was for this reason that the Indians had selected the northwestern part of Shakargarh Bulge to launch their main attack in 1965.Shakargarh was not as vital for Pakistan as for India, being one of the few areas north of Sutlej river where Pakistan could afford to trade space for time, at worst and launch a major thrust inside Indian territory to force the Indians to commit their reserves and even ease the pressure on the East wing, at best. It was a potential springboard for launching a significant thrust inside India, which had the ability to seriously limit Indian Army's freedom of manoeuvre, provided there was a Moltke or Manstein in the Pakistani GHQ! While having all the advantages of a springboard for offensive operations, Shakargarh was a defender's nightmare.
There were no serious water obstacles, unlike the areas south of Ravi River, to restrict the freedom of manoeuvre of a force commanded by an imaginative and resolute commander. The area was flat, firm and free of the boggy patches found in plenty in the areas west of Pasrur or south of the MRL canal and Ravi River.
The area was bisected by a large number of water courses and their tributaries (see map) running in a general north east- south west direction from Indian held Kashmir into Pakistan.These were non-perennial and fordable with minor recce in winters. Fields of fire were limited between 600 to 1200 yards due to clumps villages and sugar cane crops and artificial plantations called 'Rakhs' or 'Reserve Forest'. The Pakistanis had constructed a number of embankments (bunds) and anti- tank ditches to restrict an attacker's freedom of manoeuvre.
These obstacles were further strengthened by construction of concrete bunkers. In addition three lines of mines, each approximately 600 to 800 metres were laid before the commencement of the war.
OPPOSING PLANS
PAKISTANI PLAN: -
The Pakistani plan for employment of I Corps and defence of Shakargarh was an essentially reactive rather than proactive plan. As per Fazal Muqeem the Pakistani I Corps was tasked to eliminate the Indian enclave (Dharm Enclave) on the Pakistani side of the River Ravi in area Narowal on the south western border of the Shakargarh Bulge and simulate offensive actions in order to draw enemy forces into the Shakargarh area5.
The defence was based on two strong points organised around the small towns of Shakargarh, Narowal and Zafarwal which were to be held by 14 Para Brigade and 24 Brigade respectively6. It was appreciated that the main Indian thrust would be launched in the area between Degh Nala and Bein Nala.
An ad hoc covering troops force known as the 'Changez Force' under Brigadier Nisar (of Gadgor fame in 1965 war) consisting of two tank regiments (20 Lancers, the I Corps Recce Regiment and 33 Cavalry ex 8 Division) and 13 Punjab were to fight a delaying battle at each minefield belt between the two strong points i.e. Zafarwal on the east bank of Degh Nala and Shakargarh on the west bank of Bein Nala, 'with a view to causing maximum attrition on enemy armour and infantry, thereby creating an opportunity for effective counterattack by corps/division resources'7.
One tank regiment (20 Lancers having 35 Sherman, M-36-B-2 Tanks) of this force was to delay the advancing enemy along the first minefield while the second tank regiment (33 Cavalry having 41 Patton M-47/M-48 Tanks)8 was to impose delay along the second minefield.
13 Punjab the foot infantry unit with Changez Force was to provide infantry support to the Changez Force. The road between Zafarwal and Shakargarh was designated as line of no penetration and any enemy thrust south of this line was to be eliminated by launching the corps armoured reserve i.e. 8 Independent Armoured Brigade.
The 8 Armoured Brigade was not tasked to do anything to wrest initiative from the enemy and the 6 Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Division were also assigned no offensive roles and were in MODC role (Ministry of Defence Constabulary)10.
INDIAN PLAN:-
The essence of Indian I Corps plan was to take offensive action and advance into Shakargarh Bulge from the north and east with an infantry division each spearheaded by an independent armoured brigade, with a view to ensure, the security of the Pathankot Base and also the corridor leading to Kashmir on which the 15 Indian Corps in Kashmir depended11 while also ensuring that Pakistani reserves were also committed in defence of Shakargarh Bulge and could not be used in an offensive role.
The original Indian plan, keeping in view their comparative strength, was extremely ambitious and envisaged the capture of Pasrur followed by an advance to the MRL Canal12.
This was revised following the Pakistani build up against Poonch. 197113.The modified Indian plan involved a two prong advance by 54 and 39 Infantry Divisions supported by 16 and 2 Independent Armoured Brigades respectively with 54 Division with 16 Independent Armoured Brigade under command was to advance southwards in the area between Degh and Karir Nala and capture Zafarwal-Dhamtal complex.
The 39 Division (with 72 Infantry Brigade consisting of four battalions and 2 Independent Armoured Brigade) was to advance from the north and capture Shakargarh.
The 36 Infantry Division tasked to defend the most critical Pathankot-Kathua-Gurdaspur area was to initially stay on the defensive and to attack westwards towards Shakargarh in case the operational situation warranted (ie after ensuring that no Pakistani threat was imminent against Pathankot-Kathua-Gurdaspur complex).
The Indian plan was extremely conservative. There were nine infantry brigades available to Lieutenant General K.K Singh (commander of 1 Armoured Brigade at Chawinda in 1965). He earmarked four of these (168, 323, 87 and 18) along with six tank squadrons ( complete 14 Scinde Horse and 16 Light Cavalry) for guarding the critical areas of the Indian border on both flanks against a likely Pakistani attack.
These troops were deployed west of Degh Nala (two infantry brigades and a tank regiment less one squadron), opposite Nainakot (one infantry brigade and one tank squadron) and in area Dinanagar-Pathankot (one infantry brigade and one tank regiment).
This left the Indian I Corps with four infantry brigades and two armoured brigades less one tank regiment each to advance inside Pakistani territory !
OPERATIONAL SITUATION FROM 4TH TO 16TH DECEMBER 1971
The Indians were as concerned about their security as the Pakistanis but superiority in infantry enabled them to assume an offensive role.
Their relatively limited armoured resources vis-a-vis the total available Pakistani armour in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor however ensured that although Pakistani territory all along the eastern and northern boundary of Shakargarh Bulge was captured, no major strategic gain was made.
The Indian because of the minefields (the minefields were laid by 6 Engineer Battalion just back from East Pakistan in October 1971 and commanded by the authors father from October 1971 to October 1972) and because of the skill with which Brigadier Nisar handled Changez Force was slow. Soon after the commencement of operations once they realised that no Pakistani threat was likely against Pathankot-Kathua or Samba the 36 Division was also given an offensive task on 8th December, to advance against Shakargarh from the east with an infantry brigade and a tank regiment.
39 Infantry Divisions rate of advance was extremely slow and on 12 December its only two advancing brigades i.e. 72 Brigade and the 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (less one tank regiment) were placed under command 54 Division (72 Brigade and one tank regiment) and 36 Division (2 Armoured Brigade and less two tank regiments).
In addition 87 Brigade and one tank squadron of 39 Division which were in defensive role opposite Nainakot were also placed under command 36 Division and assigned an offensive role of advancing against Shakargarh along with 36 Divisions other brigades.
39 Infantry Division Headquarters was shifted to Samba area and made responsible for commanding the three infantry brigades and one tank regiment less one squadron in holding role in 'X Sector' on the right flank of the 1 Corps between Degh and Aik Nala.
The 54 Infantry Division and 16 Armoured Brigade with whom we are primarily concerned as far as the analysis of the 'Battle of Barapind-Jarpal' is concerned advanced cautiously and slowly but enough to unnerve the Pakistan Army's Chief of Staff General Hameed who despatched one of the infantry brigades (124 Brigade) of the reserve division 33 Division to I Corps on 9th December 1971 and alerting 11 Cavalry till then in Chamb for move to Shakargarh on 10th December14.
The Pakistani defences opposite 54 Division followed an inverted 'L Shaped' alignment with a horizontal alignment along 'Sakror Bund', an anti-tank ditch and embankment which ran all the way between Degh and Basantar Nala and a vertical alignment along the west bank of Basantar Nala from a point a little north of Lalial village where the Sakror Bund joined the Basantar Nala, running in a north-south direction from this point.
54 Indian Division advanced two brigades up both supported by tanks from 16 Armoured Brigade with 47 Brigade on the right and 91 Brigade on the left while the third brigade ie 74 Brigade in reserve.
47 Brigade was assigned the mission of contacting Basantar Nala opposite general area Lagwal-Jarpal and establishing a bridgehead on the west bank of Basantar Nala through which 74 Brigade was to breakout towards Zafarwal.
91 Brigade was to move on the east flank of 54 Division. By 15th December the 47 Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) closed with Basantar Nala opposite Lagwal and made a successful assault across the minefield laid in the bed of Basantar Nala on night 15/16 December15.
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| Brigadier Sher Ali Baz who commanded 24 Brigade the brigade in defence at Basantar River.His assessment of Indian strength was faulty and he was known by many observers for spending most of the time inside his bunker.Here he briefs prime minister ZA Bhutto after the war while serving as a brigade commander in Chamb |
A tough infantry fight took place and one of Indian infantry battalion commanders was killed during this operation16.
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| Lieutenant Colonel V.P Ghai led the 16 Madras extremely bravely and was killed in action in the battle for formation of bridgehead across the Basantar River |
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| Indian Army chief Manekshaw bugs up 16 Madras who fought extremely well in the bridgehead battle across Basantar River |
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| Indian Defence Minister Charan Singh appreciates 16 Madras afer thewar |
The 47 Indian Infantry Brigade was tasked to establish a bridgehead in general area Sikandarpur-Lalial-Barapind17.
It captured Siraj Chak and Laleal Forest at 8.30 p.m and Jarpal at 11.30 p.m18. Stiff fighting took place at Jarpal; and Major Hoshiar Singh a hardy Sikh Jat from Sisana in Hissar district was awarded a Param Vir Chakra; India's highest gallantry award18a.
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| Lieutenant Colonel Ratan Singh Commanding Officer 6 Madras who also fought the bridgehead battle addresses his troops after the battle at Siraj Chak |
This forced Indian 47 Brigade Commander to ask 17 Poona Horse to move into the bridgehead at once.
As per the Indian armoured corps historian, the situation was so desperate that one squadron of Poona Horse was rushed across part of the minefield even though a lane had not been cleared18b.
Captain Ejaz Alam , Squadron Commander 13 Lancers ,Bara Pind,killed in action while leading his tank squadron
A firefight followed and Indians claim that they destroyed a Pakistani Sherman despite having no night firing capability!
The forward extent of the bridgehead was east of the Lalial Reserve Forest and this forced the Poona Horse tanks to cross the forest at night and establish themselves on its western edge, so as to be able to effectively engage any counter attack force the next morning.
The CO of 17 Horse also joined C Squadron along with RHQ Troop. The rest of the regiment followed and by first light the whole 17 Poona Horse was deployed; 'C' Squadron opposite Lalial village and to the south of it on the forward edge of the forest, 'B' Squadron less two troops south of 'C' Squadron opposite Ghazipur and 'A' Squadron in reserve in area Siraj Chak a village east of Ghazipur on the eastern side of the reserve forest.
Lieutenant Colonel Hanut Singh , Commanding Officer 17 Poona Horse in the Basantar Sector during 1971 War.
Colonel Hanut Singh the commanding officer of Poona Horse was a bluebooded Rajput from one of Indo Pak sub continents most eminent families ! He is the elder brother of former Finance minister of India, Jaswant Singh Jasol (Jasol is the name of the village in Barmer district of Rajasthan). He retired as Lt. General.
It is significant to note that the Indians were all praise for the Pakistani infantry defending Jarpal; unlike the Pakistani infantry on the north i.e. opposite 6 and 16 Madras18c.
A Pakistani tank burning after being hit
THE 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE COUNTER ATTACK ON BARAPIND JARPAL -16 DECEMBER 1971
It appears that Headquarters 1 Corps did not seriously appreciate the gravity of 54 Indian Division's advance towards Zafarwal. 8 Armoured Brigade was concentrated in general area Qila Sobha Singh-Pasrur from 11th December onwards. On 15th December the brigade was told to be prepared for ' a brigade attack east of Bein Nala to recapture lost territory up to River Ravi'!19
It may be noted that no effort was made to impose caution on the advancing enemy who leisurely breached all three minefields from 5 to 15 December maintaining a rate of mile on an average one and a quarter mile per day. This was not because of paucity of reserves, but paucity of resolution and decisiveness in the 1 Corps Headquarters or in the GHQ to spur 1 Corps! General Fazal Muqeem very accurately described 1 Corps conduct of the defensive battle as 'passive defence of 1 Corps' 20.
A Pakistani tank burning after being hit
8 Armoured Brigade was preparing for the grand counter attack that it was supposed to launch east of Bein Nala to recover all lost territory up to River Ravi which it was supposed to launch in Nainakot area when it was suddenly informed at 0430 hours 16th December by the infantry formation in defence that the enemy had breached the minefield on Basantar Nala at Lagwal21.
At 0515 hours the armoured brigade headquarters issued a warning order assessing an enemy tank squadron and an infantry battalion which had crossed the Basantar Nala and was established in area Lalial Forest and was being 'contained by own infantry and an independent squadron'22. On the other hand the infantry brigade commander of the area i.e. Brigadier Sher Ali Baz (24 Brigade) assessed the enemy in Jarpal as one tank troop and one infantry company!23 Lieutenant General Irshad the 1 Corps Commander ordered 8 Independent Brigade Commander to 'Restore the situation with minimum force'24.
8 Armoured Brigade Commander earmarked 13 Lancers one of its three tank regiments to deal with the situation and gave the following instructions/orders:-
'Approximately squadron of tanks and infantry battalion in village Siraj Chak area on the west bank of Basantar. This penetration has been contained by own infantry/tanks...and directed 13 Lancers to establish a counter penetration position25 in area Pindi Channian west of village Jarpal immediately 26'
13 Lancers along with other 8 Brigade units was located a little south of Zafarwal. It concentrated in Jabal-Mehla area by 0745 hours along with its affiliated armoured infantry company. 'A' Squadron which was earmarked for the 'Counter Penetration' task was briefed by the CO 13 Lancers and crossed road Zafarwal-Shakargarh at 0800 hours.
While on the move it was ordered on wireless by the CO to move towards area Sikandarpur and destroy a few enemy tanks which were breaking out from area Lalial. (It may be noted, that this must have been a false alarm, since no Indian account mentions any such offensive movement at eightish in the morning).
This modification in plan resulted based on new orders from 8 Armoured Brigade Commander who had received these from 24 Infantry Brigade Commander. The brigade commander had asked CO 13 Lancers to 'send a squadron to contain enemy penetration' but the CO decided to 'attack north and destroy enemy tanks'27. 'A' Squadron moved to Sikandarpur and was fired at by enemy tanks/anti-tank guns from Ghazipur village. The squadron formed up and attacked losing in the process 8 tanks and two officers killed and wounded.
The remaining six tanks of A Squadron withdrew and deployed along with Pakistani infantry holding defences at Sakror Bund.
Meanwhile at 0830 hours while 'A' Squadron was moving towards Ghazipur CO 13 Lancers, entirely on his own judgement, also ordered 'C' Squadron to take a 'Counter Penetration Position' in Pindi Chanian area and while 'C' Squadron was preparing to do so changed his orders, ordering both 'B' and 'C' Squadrons to 'proceed to Barapind and attack six to seven enemy tanks and infantry company in Jarpal area'28.
All that followed was disastrous and both the squadrons were engaged by heavy enemy anti-tank and artillery fire, losing twenty tanks and in the process, three officers killed and two officers wounded.
13 Lancers claims that the enemy fell back from Barapind29 (which was of no consequence to both Indians and Pakistanis in any case) while the Indians claim that they had never occupied Barapind30 (again of no consequence even if they had done so).
A destroyed Pakistani tank
It was during this action that Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal a Punjabi Hindu from originally from Sargodha District exhibited extreme valour and saved the Indian position as per the Indian Armoured Corps historian; an action which was acknowledged by grant of a posthumous Param Vir Chakra; India's highest gallantry award.
Arun Khetarpal as a cadet
Second Lieutennat Arun Khetarpal shakes hands with Indian C in C Manekshaw when he visited 17 Poona Horse
We will briefly discuss the Indian position during this whole affair. The Indians were holding the bridgehead as we earlier discussed with two tank squadrons with a third in reserve (it has been erroneously claimed that there were two or three Indian tank regiments defending the bridgehead); 'C' Squadron Poona Horse on the right holding area Lalial and south , 'B' Squadron less two troops holding area Ghazipur and south and two troops of 'B' Squadron beefing up the defences of 3 Grenadier Battalion in village Jarpal.
It was essentially 'C' Squadron Poona Horse which faced 'A' Squadron 13 Lancers and 'B' Squadron Poona Horse which faced 'B' and 'C' Squadrons of 13 Lancers. Once 13 Lancers brought in its two remaining squadrons the Indians reinforced Jarpal with half squadron of its 'A' Squadron which was in reserve in Siraj Chak area.
Once 31 Cavalry attacked the Indians brought the remaining tanks of 'A' Squadron in Jarpal area.
By 1200 hours 13 Lancers which was praised by the Indians for its tremendous valour, keeping aside all the foolhardiness of their modus operandi,31 was written off from the order of battle of the 8 Armoured Brigade! The issue now was no longer containment since the Indians were also considerably shaken, having suffered a large number of tank and infantry casualties in the process.
Such was the elan and dash of this attack that the Indian armoured corps historian admitted that 'the only occasion that a breakthrough could have occurred was when two squadrons of 13 Lancers (following Major Nasir's exhortation described in the previous sentence) attacked together in the afternoon, but a gallant last-ditch stand by three tanks of the Poona Horse averted the danger' .
Brigadier Khwaja Mohammad Nasir is another example of defective Pakistani promotion system .He was phenomenally brave at Bara Pind but was not promoted beyond brigadier due to petty intelligence reports of Pakistans miserable intelligence agencies which failed repeatedly in war time intelligence gathering.On the other hand many armour officers who reached two and three and four star ranks like Rahmat ,GA , Ahsan Hayat,Zarrar Azeem etc had near zero war record .All depended on who you knew and how many good ACRs you could manage to increase your oficer efficiency index .
An outstanding and exceedingly brave officer who should have been promoted to general rank ! Miles above most armour three and four stars ! But then Indian and Pakistan Armies promote wind bags who are hopeless ! It is a miracle that an outstanding man like Tariq Khan became a three star ! A triumph of destiny over a thoroughly rotten promotion system !
But the Indian historian went further and instead of making ridiculous claims that the Indians were more martial frankly admitted that the Pakistani failure had a direct connection with incompetent leadership. Gurcharan Singh thus said: 'Pakistani armour suffered casualties because of bad use of ground and tactical ineptness'31a.
It was after this second attack of 31 Cavalry that the Indians reinforced the bridgehead with approximately 12 tanks from Brigade headquarters, and half squadron 4 Hodsons Horse.
The situation now was well in control with 27 Cavalry and 35 FF of 124 Brigade in reserve and the Indian threat (that is if there was any despite Pakistani numerical tank superiority of three to one or three to two in Barapind-Jarpal area) was removed.
Remnants of 'A' Squadron 13 Lancers remaining tanks were in counter penetration position opposite Ghazipur, 'B' and 'C' Squadrons in counter penetration position opposite Barapind and Jarpal and 31 Cavalry in the middle.
On night 16/17 December the 8 Brigade and 24 Brigade commander decided to attack the bridgehead which had been most disastrously contained with the third tank regiment 27 Cavalry and 35 FF, both of which were to attack and capture Jarpal (another mud village of no tactical consequence).
The infantry brigade commander who according to many officers of the 24 Brigade rarely left his headquarters however insisted that 35 FF, a newly raised but highly integrated and motivated foot infantry unit to launch a daylight attack without tank support on a bridgehead which two tank regiments had failed to dent !
The commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja led the senseless attack and it is best to quote the Indians who were all praise for the gallantry of this indomitable battalion and were shocked at the senselessness of the whole affair; 'At dawn 39th FF launched its attack for the recapture of Jarpal. The attack was doomed to failure.
Launched in broad daylight as it was over open ground in full view of one tank squadron plus and one infantry battalion and covered by their combined weapons. Tanks and artillery opened fire when the Pakistanis emerged from cover from their forming up place.It was a foolhardy venture,the attackers were literally massacred but they persisted in their attempt to close until the few remnants fell only about 50 metres from tanks of 4 Hodsons Horse.
At about that time the news of Pakistani acceptance of ceasefire was received. The whole of this gallant battalion was sacrificed to no purpose...ceasefire became effective at 8.00 p.m. and guns fell silent on both sides. "
The next day 80 dead bodies of the 39th Frontier Force including their commanding officer, second in commands and adjutants were handed over to the Pakistanis'37'
Hail Indomitable Heroes Hail! Despite of all your Generals and Brigadiers ye prevailed!
This battle was in my mind when I wrote these remarks in the visitors book of the Armour Mess Nowshera in mid 1993 at the time of the Armoured Corps Commanding Officers Conference
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| Indian Western Command Chief Candeth inspects a destroyed Pakistani tank |
The Indians rightly awarded two of their highest gallantry awards to their soldiers, but nothing beyond an SJ was granted to the brave men who died at Barapind-Jarpal !
(I refer to the tank regiments although I believe that Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja was miserly awarded a posthomous Hilal i Jurrat although he deserved a Nishan i Haidar ---but then what were Akrams disqualifications ? He did not belong to an old battalion which could link him to the generals mostly from old battalions and did not have that old boy network ? Now compare this with Nishan i Haidars awarded in 1965 on dubious grounds--Refers Major General Tajammul Hussain Maliks interview done by this scribe in September 2001 and also available on this site)
The Indians even awarded their highest award to Major Hoshiar Singh Cheema who survived the battle but many equally brave soldiers of 13 Lancers, 31 Cavalry or 35 FF were not considered worthy of being awarded a Nishan-i-Haidar.
Perhaps there is something seriously wrong with the whole system of the award of gallantry in our army?
What is the basis ; is it that an officer has won the Sword of Honour or is from an old regiment, or that his citation was written well, or that he was liked by his brigade or divisional commander before the war?
Fazal-i-Muqeem well summed up at least 8 Division's performance (commanded by Major General Abdul Ali Malik) when he said:--
'The few counter attacks, which 8 Division tried during the war were most noticeable by their lack of planning. The units were hurled into battle without having been given enough time for planning and preparations'.3
ANALYSIS
Impact of Experiences of 1965 War on the Principal Decision Makers' Minds.
Most analysis of Barapind-Jarpal are unfortunately superficial because they concentrate on the superficial aspects of the whole affair. The principal reason for the failure at Barapind was neither the artillery factor, nor the assessment of situation, nor incompetence of the armoured brigade commander but something much deeper. This was the deep impact of experiences of 1965 war on the principal decision makers' mind.
First of all we will discuss Brigadier Ahmad the commander of 8 Armoured Brigade. Brigadier Ahmad, had distinguished himself as a squadron commander at Gadgor in 1965 war a few miles west of Degh Nala and had played a major role in the failure of the Indian 1st Armoured Division's failure to achieve a major breakthrough on 8th September. It appears that this experience at Gadgor shaped many of his actions in 1971.
The Battle of Gadgor was a peculiar battle in which Pakistan's 25 Cavalry had clashed with two tank regiments of the Indian Army, with both units on the march and with both deploying in a line formation in a most impromptu manner without knowing the strength or composition of the enemy in front.
The Indians had the potential to outflank 25 Cavalry by virtue of having nine tank squadrons against three of 25 Cavalry but failed because their armoured brigade commander (who ironically commanded 1 Indian Corps in 1971) was unnerved due to reports of a false alarm on his flank.
The action at Gadgor was a glorious feat as far as 25 Cavalry and then Major Ahmad were concerned.
But it was one of those unique incidents which rarely occur in military history!Both sides did not know, who was opposing them; 25 Cavalry having no clue that they were opposing the whole Indian armoured division and the Indian 1st Armoured Division thinking that they were opposed by an armoured brigade!
Artillery was of no consequence in this action since both sides clashed by accident and artillery fire made a limited impact on the battle! At this time there were no armoured brigades in Pakistan 6 Armoured Division and the Battle of Chawinda was fought as a largely ad hoc battle with divisional headquarters directly telling units what to do.
It appears that Gadgor experience influenced both Brigadier Ahmad and GOC 8 Division who at that time was commanding 24 Infantry Brigade at Gadgor. Later on artillery played a pivotal role in defeating deliberate Indian assaults opposite Chawinda from 12th to 21 September 1965.
However these were downplayed because of the inter arm rivalry and Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Choudhry the architect of artillery plan at Chawinda was sidelined and retired as a brigadier despite having had a brilliant career.
Post 1965 propaganda in Pakistan painted the Battle of Chawinda as a triumph of armour and infantry; hardly ever admitting that artillery played any role in it! This was due to the British inherited legacy in which artillery was despised as an arm by infantry and armour officers!Now we will discuss 13 Lancers.
The experiences of this unit in 1965 war played a major role in conditioning its attitude in 1971. In 1971 this unit was launched in Chamb against an Indian Squadron equipped with AMX-13 tanks which had no potential to oppose the six to one tank superiority concentrated against them by Pakistan in Chamb during Operation Grand Slam.
Even technically AMX-13 was a matchbox with extremely thin armour as compared to the Patton/Sherman tanks employed by Pakistan against it. 13 Lancers was conditioned by the Grand Slam experience when it was opposed by an enemy which was outnumbered, as well as surprised. This experience conditioned their behaviour in 1971 and they had faith in the tank charge which had succeeded in Grand Slam in front of AMX-13 but had no chance of success in front of Centurions of a tank regiment as illustrious as 13 Lancers!
DOCTRINAL AND OTHER TACTICAL FAILURES
Brigadier Jahangir Karamat (later General) who was from 13 Lancers categorically said that the armoured briagde commander asked both 13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry to attack as soon as possible implying that there was no need to cut short the batle procedure and there was no need to panic;but both the units and specially 13 Lancers cut through various parts of the battle procedure like liaision with infantry,preliminary recce etc leading to the phenomenal tank losses that it later suffered.
Even the method of attack of both units was different;which proved that even at brigade level;tactical thinking was whimsical and differed from unit to unit;even in important things like basic drills of operations of war!
CRUX OF THE WHOLE ISSUE
There is one fact which is missed in most analysis’s of the Battle of Barapind and most other tank battles of Indo-Pak war.This refers to handling of units above regiment level.
There is one striking parallel between Battle of Gadgor fought in 1965 where 25 Cavalry checked the 1st Indian Armoured Briagde(ie 1st Indian Armoured Div) and in Barapind where 16 Light Cavalry stopped the whole 8 Armoured Brigade.
The fact that stands out is that handling of unit till regiment level was good in defence while handling of units beyond brigade level was extremely poor and especially in offensive operations! Even the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division which did well in Chawinda fought an essentially defensive battle.
In Gadgor, 25 Cavalry did extremely well as a unit but the Indians failed miserably as a brigade at Gadgor;despite a four to one superiority; and the same happened at Barapind.
The conclusion is that both the armies failed to function as dynamic entities beyond regimental level!The troops and the young leaders till squadron were equally brave and leaders beyond unit level almost equally weak in handling more than one unit.
Even in Khem Karan Pakistani armour succeded till unit level but failed misearbly beyond in attack; which is a far more difficult operation to coordinate, execute and synchronise than attack.
Thus Khem Karan was triumph of 6 Lancers and failure of 4 and 5 Armoured Brigades in attack!
The same tendency was present at the Corps level, althoughn the Indians improved over it since they had the system of corps in vogue earlier than Pakistan Army.
They learnt it from 1965 when their 1 Corps had miserably failed to function as a Corps.
Even in Shakargarh the Indians failed to concentrate more than one armoured regiment at any one place at a particular time.
The Battle of Barapind was the triumph of one unit over a brigade in defence but proved that the Gadgor experience;ie inability of both armour commanders to handle more than one tank regiment was valid even in 1971!
The only man in the subcontinent who came close to succesful handling of more than one tank regiment in offence was an infantry general (like Rommel) ie General Eftikhar who despite near parity successfully handled an armoured force of more than two tank regiments. A small feat in western military terms but a big one in the Indo-Pak military scenario. Praval the Indian writer hit the nail on the head when he observed that in Shakargarh bulge the Indians failed to concentrate at any one time more than one tank regiment and that at no time was more than one tank regiment in action, or in contact with the enemy.
MAJOR GENERAL EFTIKHAR KHAN (JANJUA) -(HE WAS HALF GERMAN OR FRENCH)
EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES
Clausewitz clearly and repeatedly stated many times in his book 'On War' that a strategic reserve that had no bearing on the decisive battle was a negation of the whole idea of having a strategic reserve. Thus what was the use of 6 Armoured Division or 17 Division when they did nothing and had no bearing on the whole battle of Shakargarh!
There is some truth in Iqbal's verse 'Man never suffers defeat, without perishing he goes into retreat'!
ROLE OF HEADQUARTER 1 CORPS
The only role of 1 Corps Headquarters was handling of Corps reserves but commander 1 Corps abdicated from this responsibility taking no interest in what 8 Armoured Brigade did or what it was supposed to do. 1 Corps Headquarters was as a matter of fact overtaken by the friction of war.
The gears of whole higher command mechanism of 1 Corps were jammed and Commander 1 Corps did not have the powerful iron will to overcome this friction, nor did he have the coup d oeil or operational vision to supply the much needed oil to lubricate the gears of 1 Corps operational ability.
1 Corps possessed numerical superiority over the Indians in armour, the arm of decision and had the potential to make the Indians react to its moves rather than reacting to their moves.
As Fazal Muqeem rightly described 1 Corps assumed a passive role and merely kept reacting instead of seizing the initiative; which was well within its capability; keeping in view the relative superiority in tanks.
So disgusted were the officers with the army high command, that the revolt which finally resulted in the exit of Yahya Khan started from 6 Armoured Division, which was not utilised at all throughout the war.
1 Corps Headquarters was vacillating and indecisive, unable to even assess as to which was the most dangerous enemy threat, and till 15 December was thinking of employing 8 Armoured Brigade for a raid at Nainakot, more than 20 miles east of Barapind!1 Corps Headquarters was also directly responsible for keeping the artillery out of the planning of operations.
Shaukat Riza the official historian of Pakistan Army noted this anti- artillery bias of Headquarters 1 Corps in the following words: 'When Headquarters 1 Corps was established in Gujranwala, its artillery component was driven out nine miles away to Nadipur.
Even for the capture of Dharam Enclave Headquarters Artillery I Corps was kept out of picture'39. Instead of ensuring that artillery, armour and all arms worked as a team, Commander 1 Corps established a precedence which aimed at increasing the inter arm rivalry which both Pakistan and Indian Armies had inherited from the British (but which had been reduced in Indian Army, by virtue of having an artillery C in C etc).
Thus when commander 8 Armoured Brigade made his counterattack plans he did not consult the corps artillery Commander or any other infantry divisional artillery commander at all.
ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION
Barapind-Jarpal was essentially a failure in assessing a situation correctly. There was no doubt from 5 December onwards that the principal threat to Pakistani 1 Corps was from the 54 Division which although very slowly was surely advancing towards Zafarwal-Pasrur complex, possession of which was vital for anyone who wanted to hold the initiative in Shakargarh Bulge.
1 Corps Headquarters failed to assess this simple fact and did not function at all as an operational headquarters except as a post office processing requests for reinforcements.
The crossing of Basantar should not have come as a surprise at all on the morning of 16 December, but it appeared that the corps headquarters was not prepared for this eventuality. Instead the situations assessment was relegated to the holding infantry battalion and the infantry brigade commander made no serious attempt to keep a close liaison with either the armoured brigade headquarters.
Even as late as the morning of 16 December he insisted that enemy strength across Basantar was no more than a tank troop and an infantry company. The armoured brigade commander also made no independent effort to confirm or disregard the assessment of the infantry commander and assumed that a tank regiment could deal with the situation without utilising divisional or corps artillery's fire support.
The CO of 13 Lancers who should have been the most concerned person made no effort to assess the situation and was confident that one tank squadron could deal with the enemy! The engagement that followed was impromptu and 13 Lancers, was committed as a unit of sheer reflex action while conducting fire fights with individual Indian tanks.
ROLE OF 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE HEADQUARTER VIS-A-VIS ITS UNITS
8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters' failed in three counts; i.e.
(1) the assessment of the situation,
(2) ability to employ the tank resources correctly
(3) and in incorporating artillery to support its offensive operations.
The headquarters was formed in 1970 and the concept of an independent brigade fighting in the environment of a corps was new at least as far as the Pakistan Army was concerned.
The operational situation in 1971, was far more complex than the one in 1965 when the 6 Armoured Division was fighting a battle on a twelve mile frontage with an enemy which was only attacking it frontally. In 1971 1 Corps was dealing with an operational situation in which Shakargarh Bulge was being attacked from three distinct directions over a frontage which was more than 60 miles wide with no clear cut operational plan to counter it.
8 Armoured Brigade had worked on about 25 contingencies and operated in an environment in which its corps headquarters was already paralysed by indecision and vacillation.
Later on it became fashionable to criticise Brigadier Ahmad and to state that it was a failure of one man. Brigadier Ahmad was one of the finest officers of the armoured corps and was therefore placed in an independent command.
The failure of 8 Armoured Brigade was not failure of one individual but that of the whole Pakistan Armoured Corps! The blunders were committed at all levels and 13 Lancers lost most of its tanks, not because of Brigadier Ahmad but because of the erratic attitude of its CO who on his own decided to reap some glory by ordering an attack when he had been ordered by his brigade commander to go into counter penetration position.
8 Armoured Brigade Headquarter's major failure was in failure to utilise artillery; but we must remember that at that time and to some extent till even now at least in armoured corps, artillery was despised as an arm, and any other man in Ahmad's place would have acted no differently41.
It appears that 8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters was unnerved once 13 Lancers was decimated and ordered 31 Cavalry to attack at once without realising that the one tank regiment attacking at the same place where another had just failed was against all tactical principles!
It is possible that Brigadier Ahmad was forced to bring in 31 Cavalry since the high losses of 13 Lancers had created a grave situation which could be remedied only by bringing in another tank regiment, to deter the Indians from exploiting their tremendous success against 13 Lancers.
Even the contrast between 13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry's conduct was glaring. 31 Cavalry despite being a new unit conducted its attack in a far more deliberate manner than 13 Lancers; something which was noticed; as we have already discussed even by the Indian armoured corps historian.
The unnecessary losses that 13 Lancers suffered were entirely avoidable had its CO followed the instructions he had received and went for a counter penetration position.
The Indians fought well, but they did so out of sheer desperation ! It is ironic that while armour was singled out as an arm for the Barapind failure,the disease which had led to it was not diagnosed.It was a disease born in the Ayub-Musa era and had a deep connection with the British military legacy afflicting the whole army.
Brigadier Ahmad was not promoted after the war, but this had less to do with Barapind and more with personal likes and dislikes!
GOC 8 Division whose conduct as we have discussed was complimented by Fazal Muqeem was promoted! (the odds favour the areas in between Chenab and Indus rivers )
Another Brigadier who did not have the moral courage to join his brigade in Chamb (Brigadier Rahimuddin-although a tiger in the squash court ) and evaded active service on the pretext of martial law duty, was promoted and became a full general ! But that had more to do with his daughter getting married to the usurper Zias son than with his performance or absence in war !
All along in the war this great captain of war absented himself from his 111 Brigade in Chamb on pretext of being involved in recording summary of evidence of Sheikh Mujeeb ur Rahman ! Had the great Eftikhar Khan Janjua survived this man might not have risen beyond a brigadier
To read more about the ham handed manner in which training is done in Pakistan Army and officers selected for higher ranks read the following :--
http://pakistan-army-interviews.blogspot.com/2010/12/assessmentmilitary-training-and.html
GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION
We will examine this extremely fallacious assertion in brief. The principal decision makers as we have seen assessed that the enemy in front was a troop of tanks or a squadron and thought in a most cavalier manner that it could be swept aside by just sending a tank regiment without any deliberate corps artillery support.
The corps commander specifically used the words restore the situation by use of minimum force, thus implying that the threat was not as grave as to merit the employment of maximum force!Even keeping in view the relative strength the Indians were not capable of achieving much.
What did they have; a tank regiment and two Madras and one Grenadier battalions against three Pakistani tank regiments and one infantry brigade immediately available and one tank division and infantry division within 20 miles of the bridgehead!
And if the threat was so grave, how was it that 1 Corps realised its gravity only at 0430 hours on 16 December.
Two factors stand out in the whole affair.
Also see on the link below assessment of Major GeneralN.U.K Babar about commander of Pakistans 1 Corps:--
http://pakistan-army-interviews.blogspot.com/2010/12/major-general-nuk-babar-on-pakistan.html
One was a vacillating and highly indecisive corps headquarters which had no clear grasp of the operational situation and viewed things in view of straight geometrical lines like a drill sergeant major!
There was no cause for concern and 8 Armoured Brigade was leisurely being told to raid Nainakot till 15 December and suddenly the situation became grave when the enemy crossed the line of no penetration.
What was the rationale in not accepting the gravity of threat from 5 December onwards and resorting to countermeasures to wrest the initiative from the enemy, when it was evident that the intention of this particular enemy division was to capture Zafarwal and to cross the so called line of no penetration!
The second factor which stands out is that 8 Division Commander, 24 Brigade Commander and perhaps the armoured brigade commander wanted to achieve a local victory which they suddenly realised was much required keeping in view the drain on the morale of own troops due to the constant withdrawal through the various layers of minefields since 05 December.
If this was the motivation then the modus operandi in which it was aimed at was extremely costly! The thirst for glory and honour are perfectly reasonable and honourable aspirations provided they are matched by equal willingness to share risks of battle and are accompanied by strength of intellect and ability and the resolution to execute a viable plan.
These were sadly missing in all headquarters from brigade and onwards!It appears that the prime motivation in all the principal decision makers mind at both brigade and regimental level in 8 Armoured Brigade was ''thirst for glory'' which they thought was cheaply purchasable by launching a squadron or two at a force estimated at six or seven tanks or a squadron at the most; not a grave threat, and something that could be dealt with by utilising, just one third of 8 Armoured Brigade's tank strength!
It was only after 16 December when the outcome turned out to be disastrous; was a myth created that 8 Armoured Brigade despite suffering colossal losses had saved Shakargarh Bulge or Zafarwal !
That the enemy in front was a tank brigade or two tank regiments; and certainly not a single tank regiment; which unfortunately was the actual case!
In justice to the brigade commander it must be admitted that he had asked 13 Lancers to contain the enemy by fire; but CO 13 Lancers on his own overzealous attitude decided to attack!
The commanding officer of 13 Lancers had he died like Akram Raja of 35 FF the trauma may have been much less! But armour boys are armour boys and Masood Chhakra was no Sahibzad Gul !
At Chawinda just six years earlier the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division with a lesser strength in infantry but parity in tanks had stopped the whole Indian 1st Armoured Division aided by two infantry divisions from breaking out.
Here at Chawinda; the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division had stopped the Indians not by charging without artillery support; but by making optimum use of tanks containing the Indians by fire and defeating Indian infantry attacks by artillery fire.
At Barapind what was the gravity in containing an Indian infantry brigade with one tank regiment with three tank regiments and one foot infantry and one mechanised infantry battalion by fire as was done six years earlier with exactly the same Patton tanks in defence and the same Indian Centurion tanks seeking to breakthrough!!!!
The failure at Barapind was later rationalised by saying that the Indian threat was grave and that the blunders committed were a natural result of the confusion caused because of the gravity of the threat!
The conduct of the two tank regiments clearly point towards doctrinal procedural and tactical failures particular to the armoured corps.
Due to some phenomenal command blunder artillery fire support was not coordinated and 35 FF attacked without artillery fire support36 at 0530 hours. The infantry battalion was delayed and the armoured brigade commander called off the planned attack34 which was originally scheduled to be launched at 0430 hours 17 December35.
The deliberate manner in which the attack was launched could not compensate for the nominal artillery support and the frontal approach and the attacking squadron of 31 Cavalry was beaten back with a loss of ten out of fourteen tanks destroyed and a squadron commander and another officer killed. The issue now was no longer containment since the Indians were also considerably shaken, having suffered a large number of tank and infantry casualties in the process.
The squadron formed up and attacked losing in the process 8 tanks and two officers killed and wounded. The remaining six tanks withdrew and deployed along with Pakistani infantry holding defences at Sakror Bund.
Since I joined the armoured corps in 1981 I heard thousands of time that despite losses 8 Armoured Brigade had done a wonderful job!
The fact remains that the only people who did a wonderful job despite all the tactical ineptness at regiment and above were the officers and men of 13 Lancers; men like Major Nasir41a who were praised by the Indians, or 35 FF who assaulted in face of certain destruction!
EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARMOUR
The battle of Bara Pind was not only a failure of Brigade and Corps level but also a failure at tactical level.
It is unfortunate that while the armoured brigade commander was criticised, the fact that execution at regimental level played as much a part in failure as the higher headquarters was ignored.The battle even without sufficient artillery support was not as potentially disastrous as made by the piecemeal and cavalier manner in which 13 Lancers was handled in particular by its CO.
Instead of utilising the whole regiment to attack in depth he employed a squadron; ordering it into certain depth. The second attack involving two squadrons, however, came close to achieving a breakthrough; something which was admitted by the Indians and proves that a more deliberate attack by I Lancers could have led to a breakthrough.
Gurcharan Singh thus said, 'Firstly it made no sense to attack with only one squadron at a time. The armour counter attack neither had the numerical advantage nor the depth to have a chance to succeed; the only occasion when a breakthrough could have occurred was when two squadrons of 13 Lancers attacked together in the afternoon, but a gallant last ditch stand by three tanks of Poona Horse averted the danger.'
This proves that a regiment attack with all three squadrons could have succeeded and Bara Pind which has gone down in history as a childish blunder could have been a great battle if Commander 8 Brigade had insisted that 13 Lancers must attack as a regiment ... but then there were serious doctrinal and battle procedures in armoured corps as an arm and the fact that Bara Pind was a fiasco despite the fact that the best officer of the armoured corps was commanding the brigade; does not paint a bright picture about the armoured corps of that time!
Later on the whole blame was heaped on the brigade commander and the fact that the failure had a lot to do with doctrine, poor tactics as taught and practised was ignored. This does not mean that the armoured corps did not have good brigadiers.
Gurcharan Singh saw in Brigadier Nisar the commander of Changez Force a much better commander. He actually praised Changez Force saying; 'Pakistan armour functioned well in the role of covering troops. It managed to delay a superior armour force for a longer period than it could have planned for', a tribute from an enemy to a brigadier who was not promoted for having done well !
(But Nisar the man who had saved Pakistan at the Battle of Gadgor on 8th September 1965 had no mai baap in the army , was not from the so called martial belt in between Chenab and Jhelum rivesr and thus retired as a brigadier ! While Abdul Ali Malik guilty of launching thoughtless counter attacks became a three star !)
It is instructive to note that the Indians have admitted that the day was saved by a 'last ditch stand by just one tank troop leader', which means that Bara Pind like Gadgor in 1965 was a fluke where the Indians were able to hang on by the sheer skin of their teeth, while in 1965 it was one tank squadron in particular and ironically Brigadier Ahmad's squadron with Brigadier Ahmed in lead which saved the day!
Perhaps there is a greater power which decides the fate of armies in which doctrine and tactics are taught in the manner of a novice and concentration is on polo; push and pull etc.
EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY
There was nothing new in employing or not employing artillery at Barapind!
The fact that no use was made of the six field, eight medium and two heavy artillery batteries42 which could have been potentially utilised by 8 Brigade or 24 Brigade or 8 Division proves the presence of a disease which was not presently merely in 8 Armoured Brigade but in the whole army!
Poor employment of artillery had led to a serious British reverse at Chillianwala in January 1849.
The British learnt their lesson and made full use of artillery at the final battle of Gujrat if the 2nd Sikh War as a result of which they won this battle with minimum casualties. One British writer was frank enough to admit that Gujrat was won because of 'the power of superior artillery and disciplined cooperation against a more numerous, equally brave, but less coherent enemy compelled to fight on open ground'43.
In Pakistan at least at the army level the role of artillery in all our successes was not fully appreciated as well as incorporated in doctrine training and in operational methodology. Thus the concentration was on the macho image of the tankman or infantry man whereas in reality artillery had played a decisive role in many Indian failures opposite Lahore, in Chamb and at Chawinda!
Those from infantry and armour who dominated the scene were not honest enough to admit it; and thus at Barapind despite all the martial and Islamic fervour and a clear cut three to one majority in tanks, but minus artillery support of something like 4 Corps Artillery Brigade; 8 Armoured Brigade; an elite fighting outfit ,was brought to grief; failing to dislodge one regiment of Centurions supported by three infantry units, out of which one was that of a mixed composition and two of those Madrasis despised as non-martial in Pakistan!
Our soldiers were second to none in valour; but valour alone minus military talent, coup d oeil and artillery support is no guarantee of success. It was for this reason that G.G.O Number. 1277 of 1861 had laid down specifically:-'Resolved henceforward, with such few exceptions as may be rendered necessary by local considerations, there shall be no native artillery'.44
ANALYSIS OF INDIAN CASUALTIES
I came across the assertion many times while in service that 1 Corps caused enormous casualties on the Indians in Shakargarh. This assertion is not proved by facts. The toughest battles of the 1971 war were fought opposite 54 Division and the following facts do not prove that 54 Division suffered high casualties45:-
Now compare the Pakistani losses of 35 FF at Jarpal ie 64 killed,75 wounded and 12 missing46 or that of 13 Lancers which exceeded the figure of 50 casualties. Were these necessary or justified and for what purpose? Just because one feather in someone's cap was wanted. Had there been an Eftikhar leading from the front these losses may have made some sense !
The Indians suffered heavy casualties at Sulaimanke.Some 190 Killed, 196 Missing most of whom were killed or prisoners and 425 wounded.
These casualties were far heavier than those suffered by 54 Division which fought battles like those around Bara Pind Jarpal which suffered a total of some 76 Killed and 272 wounded.
So Bara Pind was a much smaller affair than Sulaimanke.
It is only sheer Pakistani incompetence that makes BARA PIND JARPAL famous.
AN ALTERNATIVE OPERATIONAL REMEDY
It has frequently been asserted that 1 Corps had no other alternative but to resort to a passive defence. This is a totally false assertion, if we take into account the resources available to 1 Corps vis-a-vis the Indians. 1 Corps had nine tank regiments in all as against six Indian tank regiments in Shakargarh Bulge.
Further 17 Division was not utilised at all to do anything throughout the war. In Chamb with just a slight numerical superiority and qualitative inferiority in tanks and parity in infantry General Eftikhar wrested the initiative from Indians in such a manner that by 10th December the Indians had withdrawn one battalion from 168 Brigade in the 'X Force Sector' opposite Charwa in 1 Corps area, and had placed the same brigade at few hours notice to move to Chamb in view of 23 Divisions attack at Pallanwala.
The Pakistani GHQ's strategy in Shakargarh was reactive rather than proactive, and all initiative despite numerical superiority in armour was surrendered to the Indians. A strategy involving a more offensive posture would have definitely forced the overcautious Indians to resort to the defensive.
It was here that we enter the realm of military talent.
There was no general officer in 1 Corps with the operational talent or resolution of an Eftikhar; and this in the final analysis was the singular misfortune of Pakistan's 1 Corps.
Till ceasefire five armoured regiments were kept on sentry duty in Pasrur area and were not utilised. The saying that a pessimist sees a calamity in every opportunity, can be exactly applied to 1 Corps conduct of battle in Shakargarh Bulge.
 |
| Pakistan had many offensive options but none were exercised |
LEVEL OF STRATEGIC SUCCESS
The Indian 1 Corps Commander was able to impose his will in strategic terms on Pakistan's 1 Corps.
With a slight relative superiority in infantry (if 17 Division is included) the Indian 1 Corps commander succeeded on two counts; firstly in ensuring that Pakistan's 6 Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Division remained fixed in Shakargarh and secondly by exerting such a pressure; despite his numerical inferiority in tanks that the Pakistani GHQ was enough unnerved to pull out 11 Cavalry from Chamb on 10 December; and bring it to Pasrur (also destroying Satrah Road on the way with their steel tracks!!!!); thereby reducing the pressure that Pakistan's 23 Division was exerting on the Indians and ultimately leading to 23 Divisions withdrawal to the west bank of Tawi.
The Indian Corps Commander was not brilliant but definitely more decisive and bold; at least as compared to 1 Corps Commander opposing him. So apprehensive was this man of Pakistani offensive capability that he initially assigned four out of his nine infantry brigades and two tank regiments out of six for a defensive role. Once he realised that the Pakistani commander opposite him was not like Abrar Akhtar or Eftikhar; he mustered greater resolution and used his troops more offensively.
FRONTAL ATTACK IN MILITARY HISTORY VERSUS IMAGINATIVE USE OF TANKS IN DEFENCE
A frontal attack against an enemy who has not been neutralised by artillery fire or surprised by following a stratagem has rarely succeed.
In 1815 at New Orleans when the British Army was one of the finest armies of the world; a similar frontal attack had led to one of the most disastrous repulses in British military annals! Thus the British suffered 2037 casualties including their commanding general killed while the US defenders suffered just 61 casualties 47
It is interesting that to note that tank is such a versatile weapon system; that the worst possible tank in defence can play havoc with the best tank when it comes to firing at an advancing tank from a stationery defensive position.
During the battle of 'Crusader' in November 1941 the British 22nd Armoured Brigade equipped with the technically overwhemingly superior 'Crusader' Tanks with 2 Pounder gun and 49mm frontal armour lost 40 out of 160 tanks when it gallantly but frontally charged the far inferior Italian Ariete Division equipped with M-13 tanks!
Most of the tanks were destroyed by anti-tank guns which were closely integrated with Italian tanks!
In July 1944 SS Obersturmfuehrer Michael Wittman was able to stop the British 7th Armoured Division with just four Tiger Tanks, annihilating their complete advance guard, knocking out 25 tanks, 14 carriers and 14 half tracks! Wittman did so without charging, but by conducting a highly imaginative defensive battle !
WHAT IS WRONG WITH PAKISTAN ARMYS TANK CORPS
Extract from my article Handling of Armour in Indo Pak wars published in Defence Journal
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/oct/handling.htm
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/aug/corps.htm
ANALYSIS
ARMOUR IN TRAINING MANOEUVRES
Various divisional level training manoeuvres were held after 1971 and many lessons were learnt. However, there is no organisational or institutional framework to scientifically evaluate the command abilities of officers beyond tank regiment level. This assertion is based on conviction and was pointed out in writing by this scribe in various army journals and is on record :—
“Evaluation of exercises which is one of the major peactime methods of judging resolution in a commander is an extremely rigorous and scientific affair. It is felt that this should be done by a select corps of officers who will be less biased in judging a man’s professional calibre. The present system, it is felt is less objective, less scientific and less profession oriented. Probably it is so because those who evaluate each other spend more time together in cantonments than in the field and thus go into the field with preconceived ideas further biased by personal likes and dislikes ............the present system of exercises are not aimed at testing the command qualities which are really decisive like resolution. Even if this is being done in certain cases then it is confined to lower command levels, which a study of military history illustrates is just not enough .........” We have got to train our commanders for adverse situations which demand unconventional audacious and imaginative planning. Presently we are afraid this is not being done. Rather exercises are demonstrations on a massive scale”.89
“There are institutions (referring to one particular institution) which deliver a verdict on command qualities of an individual without a single exercise in the field”!90 ......... “ Commanders above unit level are rarely properly exercised” ........ “ The system is producing many whose tour of regimental soldiering is with the primary aim of getting a hole punched in the service record card”.91
“Many military systems that this world saw were a conspiracy against originality and boldness”......“Create an ‘Evaluation Corps’ which will be a full time corps primarily designed/dedicated to test the professional competence of commanders at all levels (till divisional level)”.92
“Establishment of training command, responsible for planning and monitoring Army’s training is an inescapable necessity”.93
The rationale behind quoting all these observations which are on record is to prove that training manoeuvres as this scribe saw them while serving for four continuous years, without going on a single course or even a month’s leave in an armoured divison or later in other infantry formations, were not being held on a scientific basis. There were exceptions like Generals Hameed Gul, Sajjad or Brigadier Inayatullah Niazi (his other qualities/peculiarities apart) who took training manoeuvres religiously and conducted them brilliantly, but these men and particularly Hameed Gul (his so called fundamentalist political views aside) was an exception and the next two years after his departure from the armoured division as this scribe saw were the most barren years of training. The reason is simple, i.e procedural and institutional arrangements are longer lasting and more consistent and to a considerable extent compensate for individual human qualitative differences resulting from change of command from person “X” to person “Z”.
The problem is that lack of a neutral organisation which could give a second opinion on the command abilities of a commander beyond squadron unit or brigade level was missing. It was common to hear many brigade and unit commanders brag that it was their pen and not the performance of an officer on training manoeuvres which would decide the issue. This was true since it was common to see many excellent brigade commanders and unit commanders who handled their command outfits superbly in field training manoeuvres being sidelined to oblivion and obscurity while many relatively incompetent, as far performance in field was concerned, but “on paper good officers”, getting the best appointments and rising to general rank.This is as far as the armoured corps was concerned. The secondment to Saudi Arabia propelled another breed who had a good time in three years in Tabuk where exercises were a “hoax” and reached high ranks without commanding an armoured brigade (the Lahore armoured brigade being an exception since it hardly does any meaningful training at brigade level and performs other more important non training duties) or armoured division. There emerged during the period 1977-1994 a breed of essentially paper tiger commanders who had all the holes punched and had also mastered the techniques of conducting perfect armoured attacks (in reality, carefully rehearsed demonstrations) under conditions in which all the friction of war which that poor Prussian Clausewitz had written about had been eliminated through whiz kid techniques mastered in the process of hole punching and keeping the OEI high !
HANDLING OF
Handling of armour in schools of instruction also requires serious re-evaluation. During my stay in the School of Armour I observed that there were no fixed parameters or training guidelines at army level which regulated that institution. All depended on the commandant’s personality. If there was a hard taskmaster like Sher Azam Malik everything went well but everything would suddenly transform once person “Y” or “Z” came. As far as I know the school with few exceptions was a dumping ground for superseded or about to be superseded brigadiers, at least after 1971 with perhaps one or two odd exceptions. Naturally these commandants were on their way out and with few exceptions took more interest in preparing themselves for their future retired life! The same was true for instructors at Lieutenant Colonel level out of whom very few went beyond brigadier. Further the school’s location being far away from both the armoured divisions did not allow integration of students doing courses in major armour training manoeuvres as is done in the Infantry School in Quetta. This school should be re-located somewhere in the desert in Cholistan or perhaps its outer fringes or in the Potohar plateau! This scribe in May-June 1993 had made a similar recommendation for the independent armoured squadron that he was commanding and was then stationed in Okara (through an official written letter held on record) to be shifted to the desert in Tamewali or Bahawalnagar. The recommendation made as part of unit points for the divisional conference was approved by Major General Zia ul Haq the General Officer Commanding the infantry division and implemented much to the chagrin of officers who later joined the new tank regiment raised from the Phoenix ashes of that squadron! Coming back to the main line of discussion there was no system of grading in the school and the powers of the officers in charge course, the chief instructor and the higher appointment holders to alter a tactical grading done by an instructor of major or colonel rank were not limited by any margin of plus one or two as was the practice in Infantry School. I don’t know whether it has changed now from 1992.
The instructors posted after staff college to armour school were those majors who were not fit to be brigade majors or were there simply because no unit or other vacancy was available for them! This did not mean that these majors were not good since the system of assessment of staff college needs considerable revamping. The bad part was that these majors did not put up maximum hard work since they knew that the seal of relatively mediocre majors had been stamped on them and, however, hard they worked their chances for promotion beyond colonel rank were remote! Two buildings were completed in 1988-89 but these were hardly sufficient to meet the existing demands! The transparency of the system of grading could be gauged from the fact that the only two officers who got an alpha grade in tactical leg of the young officer’s basic course were sons of serving generals! This scribe had the opportunity to see one of them during the basic course and was perplexed and surprised as to how he was graded alpha. On the other hand a retired three star general’s son who had already managed a Bee Plus in the junior Staff Course (a far more tough affair than the mid career course) while his father was a serving three star general, was initially graded as Bee Minus in the Mid-Career Course whereas he certainly deserved a Bee! Later on I believe he was given a Bee, after much haggling as happened at Valtoha between 1 FF and 6 Lancers.
HIGHER ARMOUR
No major change in Pakistani higher armour command as earlier discussed in brief was made till 1987. In 1986-87 the older corps which contained both holding and striking formations were sub-divided into holding and striking corps. This arrangement although outwardly neat and superficially sound was essentially confusing and fallacious. It was regarding this change that this scribe pointed out in an article “It is felt that during conduct of operations two formation commanders of equal rank commanding a holding and strike formation respectively in the same area of operations, cannot function effectively. Even during Exercise Zarb-e-Momin this aspect was not put to trial. Training of holding and strike formations needs to be integrated thus meriting a unified operational command vested in the person of one officer of the rank of lieutenant general. The change may require creation of Army Headquarters in certain operational areas”.94
The arrangement of holding and striking corps without any higher co-ordinating headquarter was a recipe for confusion and disaster as I witnessed while serving in a holding corps, once I personally saw the lack of communication and co-ordination in training and cooperation between the concerned strike and holding corps. Thus, I was motivated to write another article in which this scribe’s recommendations for establishing a co-ordinating headquarters for the holding and striking corps were seconded by the worthy editor of the Citadel Magazine as ones which “certainly merits consideration”.95 The rationale on which these recommendations were based were: “The concept of holding and striking formation also needs reappraisal....the bifurcation in terms of offensive and defensive role, while outwardly neat and theoretically sound is historically without a successful precedent. The issue could have been resolved in exercise Zarb-e-Momin in 1989 by subjecting it to the friction of a rigorous training manoeuvre”.96 “The shield and the spear or the hammer and the anvil can function effectively only if one head synchronises and co-ordinates their operational functions. As they say that too many cooks spoil the broth, the two formations fighting the same battle in the same operational area cannot fully realise their combat potential unless a headquarter regulates their operations.How can one main headquarters 200 or 400 miles in the rear, with loads of other matters to take care of, effectively co-ordinate the operations of a hammer and anvil”.97 “The need for an army headquarters to co-ordinate and effectively command the holding and strike corps is an indispensable necessity”.98 I believe that there has been some progress since these recommendations which are on record were made in 1998. All credit, however, goes to then commandant Major General Amjad and his team who published these two above quoted articles. Had these been written in 1987 or 1988 no editor would have dared to publish them. 99
POOR INTER-ARM/INTER- UNIT COOPERATION AND LACK OF
Poor inter-arm cooperation seriously retarded the combat potential of the Pakistan Armoured Corps right from 1947. This was the worst British legacy that both the Indo-Pak armies inherited. A British observer in WW Two noted that “in the training of the armoured division, I stressed the need for co-operation of all arms in battle. One had to check a pernicious doctrine which had grown up in recent years, aided by certain civilian writers, that tank units were capable of winning an action without the assistance of other arms. The Chief agent in debunking this and many other fallacies of our pre-war pundits were the German”.100 The secret of the German Blitzkrieg tactics which revolutionised warfare lay in intimate inter-arm cooperation. The US concept of Combined Arms Teams is actually the old German inter-arm cooperation within the Panzer Division concept ‘wine in new bottles’. The British tanks in WW II on the other hand repeatedly failed to function effectively because of poor inter-arm cooperation based on inter-unit rivalry and excess of regimentation. The Pakistan Army inherited this disease and this disease instead of getting reduced became more pronounced after 1947. The army remained infantry dominated since all the chiefs from 1948 to 1972 were from infantry. From 1977 to 1988 the army remained armour dominated and preference in promotion was given to those close to Zia. Poor inter-arm cooperation led to serious operational failures in Khem Karan and in Grand Slam in 1965 and at Bara Pind in 1971. The similarity between the lack of infantry tank cooperation in Grand Slam and in Khem Karan and those of similar incidents in the case of British infantry and tanks at Gazala etc is remarkable. Even when I was commissioned in 11 Cavalry in March 1983, 29 Cavalry (in which this scribe later served for some time) being a new unit was regarded as second among equals, 7 FF the mechanised infantry unit of our brigade was viewed as an enemy and 15 SP the artillery unit was despised and considered too insignificant even to be considered an enemy. The Supply and Transport unit was regarded as a bunch of untouchables! The EME was not liked but feared, for their nuisance value in inspections, though secretly despised. It was out of question to visit the messes of these units and my friendship with an officer of 7 FF was viewed by many seniors as disloyalty to the regiment! Officers from armoured regiments were mostly friendly with officers from other armoured regiments. It was rare that any officer of the infantry division met any officer of the armoured division in Kharian.
Even within the very small armoured corps of the 1950s and 1960s there were glaring differences from regiment to regiment. There were regiments with a much higher representation in the top hierarchy dating from 1947 and there were fatherless regiments who had done well in war but had no patrons beyond the brigadier rank. The negative factor here for the armoured corps was the fact that while the regiment in infantry had a much larger number of units like the Punjab and FF group, each armoured regiment was as different from each other as France from Germany and an officer from any tank regiment only believed in patronising his very own regiment!
Parallels can be found in battle of Bir El Gubi in 1941 where the 22 Armoured Brigade frontally charged the Italians with the support of just one battery of 25 Pounders 101 and failed to capture it suffering in the process huge losses and in the Battle of Bara Pind where Pakistan’s 8 Armoured Brigade did a similar thing. The German tank general and illustrious staff officer Von Mellenthin noted this failing when he said, “their commanders would not concentrate tanks and guns for a co-ordinated battle”.102
On the other hand notorious examples of non-cooperation in 1965 and 1971 wars can be compared with the conduct of the British armour at Gazala in 1942 when the 2nd Highland infantry was destroyed by German tanks while a superior British tank force merely looked on, or in the case of the 1/6th Rajputana Rifles who were abandoned to German Panzers simply because the British armour had to go into leaguer!103
One of the most notorious examples of lack of inter-arm co-operation took place in Chawinda when first the Indian tanks withdrew from Jassoran-Buttur Dograndi-Sodreke area on their own104, and later when Indian tanks ordered to re-attack the same area later were not informed about the failure of the last night’s infantry attack!105 An Indian general frankly admitted this lack of inter arm cooperation when he said, “There were misunderstandings galore between the infantry and armour commanders in the second battle of Chawinda. A lack of rapport seems to be the only explanation..”.106 This lack of cooperation was something like 13th century inter-arm and individual rivalry which led to the failure of the Crusaders or the Mongols against the Mamelukes.Toynbee the great historian thus wrote, “the individual Mongol champion was promptly overcome by the disciplined heavy cavalry of the Egyptian Mamlukes (mostly kidnapped slaves of Slav/European origin converted to Islam after being bought by the Kurds etc). These had given warning of the supremacy of their technique at the Battle of Mansurah in AD 1250, when Frankish army of Saint Louis had paid a disastrous penalty for the thoughtless individualism of its knights, each anxious for personal honour at the expense of the disciplined formation”.107 I can state with confidence that as late as 1993 that almost each tank regiment (having seen five tank regiments and one tank squadron) or infantry regiment behaved at least symbolically like these thirteenth century knights described by Toynbee, at least in garrisons and on field manoeuvres! I am sure that the Indian army being the chip of the same block and led by as mediocre and orders oriented men is no different! At least in strength of reservoirs of mediocrity the subcontinent consists of men belonging to one nation!
THE CAVALRY
The Armoured Corps inherited a typically British cavalry charge tradition, an irrational urge of being “brave to the point of foolhardiness”.108 The Indians suffered from a similar malady and lost many tanks in attacks delivered in a cavalry charge manner at Gadgor, Phillora, Buttur, Dograndi, Sodreke, etc. Brigadier Riaz ul Karim who was sent as Deputy GOC of 6 Armoured Division described these encounters as “Kabbadi Matches”. Riaz thus observed “The normal practice on both sides was to despatch one armoured regiment at a time to probe and infiltrate (with infantry following) and the other side reacted with launching one of their own armoured regiments to stop and destroy that force. With this type of battle, there were heavy tank casualties on both sides”.109 Riaz states that “The first thing that I did was to stop the ‘Kabbadi Game’ i.e for one regiment sailing into the blues and coming back with a bloody nose”.110
NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT IN WW TWO AND INFLUENCE OF CONSERVATIVE BRITISH DOCTRINE
In all fairness the nature of Indian Army’s employment as far as the armoured corps was concerned did not make things any easier for the armoured corps of both the countries. The Indian Armoured Corps was either employed in a screen/scout role or in conditions where their opponent as in Burma was vastly inferior both numerically and quantitatively in number of tanks. Indians were not groomed for higher ranks and even the British despite better education superior literacy level and technically and qualitatively superior position did not produce a single good tank commander at any level higher than tank regiment. No wonder that they failed the Germans in France and North Africa from 1940 till 1942 when finally the scales were turned, not because of better generalship but by virtue of overwhelming numerical superiority. Further the conservative British tank doctrine which both the armies inherited and made no effort to change that armour commanders beyond unit level remained as mediocre as they were on the British side in WW II. It is no credit to the quality of British armoured corps that General Mellenthin who saw the British Army as its direct opponent for some two years noted that “ The British Artillery was the best trained and best commanded element in the British Army”.111
MISCELLANEOUS
The armoured corps of 1947 inherited many psychological hang-ups. The subconscious emphasis inherited from the British was on being an “arm of fashion and wealth” “affected carelessness” and worst of all “an arrogant non-chalance towards the duller aspects of their work”.112 During a winter collective which this scribes unit had to conduct for another armoured brigade, the other brigades units insisted that their tank commanders cannot advance unless there is a visible track going through the desert. In this case there was none! Finally the problem was resolved by asking for engineer support and a track was made with the help of earthmoving equipment! During my service I frequently heard many officers saying that a fourth tank troop in a squadron was good and added flexibility while many said that it was difficult to manage. These officers probably never understood that the Germans performed miracles with armoured divisions, which had just one Panzer Regiment (tank brigade).
LACK OF OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AT BRIGADE/BEYOND AND DOCTRINAL AMBIGUITY AND CONFUSION AT SPECIAL TO ARM
Firstly we shall discuss the leaguer concept which seriously jeopardised the success of Pakistani armour operations in Khem Karan. The British mostly withdrew from the final battle positions in North Africa because they feared the German 88 Anti-Tank Guns and wanted to have a peaceful next morning. In any case the operational situation in North Africa was not area oriented, as in Punjab but mobility oriented since any outflanked force could easily move in any direction and regain its equilibrium. In Punjab where defence was a relatively far more superior type of warfare than in the desert and holding every inch of captured territory was important, the operational situation was totally different from North Africa. Here every locality once captured had to be held since manoeuvre was far more difficult due to heavy terrain, friction and large number of artificial and natural obstacles and bottlenecks. This was a serious doctrinal failing which should have been resolved in the School of Armour. No one gave it a serious thought since it was thought that the Pattons were invincible. These pedants failed to realise that the British repeatedly failed to defeat Rommel despite possessing numerical and qualitative superiority as was admitted by Captain B.H Liddell Hart.
There was an inclination in some strike formations to use French terms in operational orders! On one occasion shortly before retirement while this scribe was an umpire with a strike infantry division, I read the term “Coup de Main” describing the division’s main attack. My knowledge of French was limited but as far as I then knew “Coup de Main” in the British military sense was a term used for a surprise attack launched in a manner which was not very deliberate or conventional. Once I pointed this out the majority was outraged and two colonels who had done the French Staff Course insisted that “Coup de Main” was the right word for describing “Main Attack or Effort”.
Then we come to brigade level. The Khem Karan failure was essentially the failure of 5 Armoured brigade. On the first day the brigade was dispersed without any coherent plan one tank regiment going for Assal Uttar from the centre and left, one tank regiment (some 19 tanks) going for Valtoha without any sizeable infantry support and the brigade headquarters sitting in Khem Karan as if it was the headquarters of Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command rather than a brigade tactical headquarter. It appears that there was no operational philosophy of handling armour at brigade level. The brigade was thus doing what a German Panzer Division could not do i.e attacking on some three axis instead of developing the operations on what the Germans called the “Schwerpunkt”.113 The concept of all arms cooperation was not understood and 6 Lancers was despatched to Valtoha on its own . Its Commanding Officer did make a request for infantry114 but this was brushed aside and mechanised infantry which was available that day did little, regardless of whatever they may claim now in their regimental histories.
Major failures in both Indian and Pakistan Armies in handling of armour occurred at brigade and division level. It appears that no lessons were derived from these failures. In my thirteen years service I witnessed changes in concept of employment of armoured brigade and division with change of brigade and divisional commanders. Thus what was executed by Brigadier Inayatullah Niazi for two years was disregarded in near totality once Inayat departed and was endorsed by the same commanding officers who had served earlier under Inayat as the Gospel truth! One i.e my second commanding officer, who had dissented under both the commanders albeit tactfully retired as a colonel! This is just one example out of innumerable examples. The School of Armour as far as I know till 1992 had no concrete or tangible set of recommendations about concept of employment or doctrine of employment of an armoured brigade or division in the various types of terrain/scenarios where employment was likely. I was in charge of all the scripts held in the Tactical Wing from December 1991 to December 1992 and did not find any such thing! Even in the School, concepts of employment changed with change of commandant or change of chief instructor! The Divisional Battle Schools of Armoured Divisions were dumping grounds of superseded or near superseded majors and colonels and their cardinal attribute was “silence of a graveyard” as I pointed out to a letter to editor of Citadel magazine in mid-1998. There was no specific to corps area of operations doctrine of operations of armour at least till 1994, at a time when the existence of a multiple number of formations like mechanised brigade, corps reserve, army reserve operating in the same area made a clarity of role/mission/doctrine of employment all the more necessary! Infantry lieutenant colonels who had done foreign staff college had rudimentary ideas about the non-linear armoured battle and the behaviour of enemy armour in the post-breakout stage! Armour after all in all three wars has failed to breakout successfully as far as both sides are concerned!
TRADITION OF LEADING FROM THE REAR AT BRIGADE AND BEYOND
One of the main reasons of slowness of British armour operations was the fact that brigade commanders with few exception like the great Jock Campbell, VC who was an artillery man, there was a tradition of leading from the rear and this certainly contributed to many failures in Grand Slam and in Khem Karan. Decision making was thus done at a snail’s pace. All sorts of false and exaggerated reports were accepted as the Gospel truth etc. The British tradition of leading from the rear had a deep connection with the level of esteem in which their staff officers were held by their field commanders. The layman reader may note that unlike the German General Staff the British never had a permanent cadre of general staff officers. In their army as in both the Indo-Pak armies attending the staff course was just a hole punching business and general staff was not a highly specialised corps in the British Army unlike the German Army where the staff officer with a crimson stripe on his uniform was a highly qualified man belonging to a corps d elite. Thus while German commanders of the rank of brigade, divisional and corps level could lead from the front staying close to the leading tank regiment, the British commanders could not do so, since they looked down on their staff officers as men who were incapable of manning their main headquarters. Thus the profound truth in Mellenthin’s observation that “the officers of the German General Staff were not mere clerks or mouthpieces of their higher commanders (Mellenthin hints without saying so that the British ones were!!!!), but were trained to accept responsibility to give grave decisions and were respected accordingly. In contrast the British fighting commanders tended to look down on the staff, and the British show a curious reluctance to appoint capable staff officers to operational commands”.115
LACK OF
There was a serious lack of offensive spirit at all levels beyond unit level. Thus Ayub did not leave Rawalpindi throughout the war. As late as 1991 a Directing Staff of Command and Staff College observed this glaring lack of aggressiveness in the army in an article published in 1991.116 The writer then an instructor at the command and Staff College and now probably commanding a division somewhere thus noted, “The Battle of Chamb was cited as an instance; where the momentum of attack dissipated after the General Officer Commanding embraced Shahadat”. The readers may note that this man was one of the few generals who led from the front. Some of the many who saw him in that role, who this scribe knows/met are Majors Suleman Butt (11C), Iftikhar Chaudhry (11 C), Shujaat Ali Janjua (the indomitable Panther Janjua from (11C) and Lieutenant Colonel Zil ur Rehman who was commanding an R & S Company.
POOR GENERAL STAFF PROCEDURES AND PLANNING ABILITY AT HIGHER LEVELS
This factor played a serious role in the Pakistani armoured division’s failure at Khem Karan in 1965. At the GHQ level the failure to appreciate that the armoured division must get out of the bottleneck between Rohi and Nikasu Nala was not appreciated. Nothing in the orders given to the 1st Armoured Division indicates that the planners understood this problem. Nikasu Nala was a pre-1947 landmark while Rohi Nala was no common pin to have missed the eyes of the planners. Poor general staff procedures at brigade and division level led to failure to concentrate all three armoured brigades across the Rohi Nala and thus was the principal reason for failure of the armoured division’s effort. The GHQ vacillation and indecision on 6th, 7th and 8th September when it issued contradictory orders to the 1st Armoured Division, sometimes to send one of its brigades to Lahore and sometimes to Sialkot117 also played a major role in adding to the imperial confusion in the armoured division.
Correlli Barnett’s observations on the British Staffs of WW II fit well on the Pakistani Staff officers role in failure to handle armour. Barnett thus noted “The pace (referring to that of armoured operations) was too fast for the slow working staffs of lower formations (referringto corps/divisional/brigade staffs) ......(German staff work, because of greater experience and better training, was always faster and more lucid than British).....and detailed organisation for the offensive was poor and confused”.118 This observation fits well with the Military Operations Directorate of both sides and all staff officers down to armoured brigade level responsible for planning/executing the operations of both the Pakistani and the Indian 1st Armoured Divisions. The British perhaps were unlucky that their opponents were Germans and the Indians and Pakistanis were perhaps very lucky that their opponents were Pakistanis and Indians!
CONCLUSION
The Gul theory of failure because infantry officers were commanding the armoured division is not vindicated by actual facts of the 1965 war. Was the Indian 1st Armoured Division or its 1st Armoured Brigade commanded by an infantry officer and yet they proved as incompetent as Naseer. After all Rommel was from infantry, Macarthur, Mead and Lee were from Engineers and Napoleon was from artillery. The fault lay in the military clique of that time who made promotions on whims and on basis of personal likes and dislikes rather than on merit. After all the finest armoured commander that the sub- continent produced was Eftikhar who was an infantry man!
The Pakistan armoured corps with the exception of one unit of armoured cars was not employed in 1947-48 war. In 1965 Pakistan Armoured Corps failed to achieve a major breakthrough despite relative qualitative superiority in tanks as well as overwhelming numerical superiority in total available number of tanks in Khem Karan due to doctrinal leadership and essentially staff incompetence centred reasons. A breakthrough was possible and one Indian general was frank enough to recall as late as 1993 General Harbaksh Singh’s remarks that “A Blitzkrieg deep into our territory towards the Grand Trunk Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us in the helpless position of a commander paralysed into inaction for want of readily available reserves while the enemy was inexorably pushing deep into our vitals.It is a nightmarish feeling even when considered in retrospect at this stage”119. Long before 1965 and 1971 civilians on the board of the boundary commission had very high hopes from both the Indian and Pakistan Armies and thus one had said “If Pakistan manages in a counterattack to make a 40 miles advance, then the defence of India would be affected. True they would lose Bhatinda and Dhuri and Pakistan forces were within measurable distance of Ambala,but they (referring to the Indian Army) do not lose all. Their communications are not upset; they lose so much of the railway line up to the extent of forty miles, but they still have the main line bringing their supplies at right angles to their forces...”120. The same member went further and gave the Indians a capability of advancing 500 miles inside Pakistan!121 Compare these remarks with two Indian three star generals remarks:— “We penetrated only 11 miles (despite a five to one superiority in tanks on 8th September and a much larger one in infantry-this scribe’s remarks) into enemy territory beyond the bridgehead at our deepest stretch, when, but for the mishandling of our forces, especially armour, the completion of our mission appeared well within our grasp”.122 Another sadly noted “it ground to a halt just four miles ahead of the bridgehead”!123 This happened not as propagandists assert in Pakistan because of some superior martial race or ideological reasons but simply because the Indian brigade and division commander lost their nerve. The Indians, the lower ranks till battalion/regiment level fought as bravely at Chawinda as their Pakistani counterparts, tankman and infantry man alike, at Khem Karan where Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division also failed to achieve a breakthrough despite a seven to one superiority in tanks in total number. Leave aside west or east of Rohi Nala which was entirely a command as well as staff planning failure. The Nikasu Nala was even clearly marked as a large water obstacle even on the maps of the Punjab Boundary Commission!124 So where do we go. The common man, the tax payer has been bled white on both sides with a very large percentage being spent on armoured corps which failed to advance pathetically beyond 4 miles on the first day of the war in face of nominal opposition or eleven miles in all 17 days or got stuck between a Nala and a canal in own territory! The generals on both sides should explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against them for strategic and operational incompetence despite being provided with superiority at the decisive point and why their command outfits which are too large for their intellectual/resolution capabilities to handle in war should not be cut to one fourth their present size! But who will bell the cat! Why not employ a good team of psychiatrists at one-fiftieth the cost spent on armour and other expensive hardware and cure the pathetic minds of the sick Indo Pak psyche! Alas! we forget what long ago Freud said, “The irrational forces in man’s nature are so strong that the rational forces have little chance of success against them. A small minority might be able to live a life of reason, but most men are comfortable living with their delusions and superstitions than with truth”. Freud thus sadly concluded “Society which has been fashioned by man reflects to a great extent man’s irrationality. As a consequence each new generation is corrupted by being born in an irrational society. The influence of man on society and of society on man is a vicious circle and only a few hardy souls can free themselves”. That was in the interwar years with Fascism rising and hatred gripping all Europe. Europe paid its price in million of lives in WW II. The Indo-Pak subcontinent has yet to learn. We saw one holocaust in 1947 but have learnt very little from it. The 1971 holocaust did not affect many in the West Wing.Brahmaputra and the tidal rivers had the capacity to take a huge load and disposal of anything was a simple operation! Had our higher leaders both civil and military or the armoured commanders been more competent, perhaps things may have been settled a bit less amicably albeit more swiftly in the 1947-48, 1965 or 1971 wars! In the post-nuclear scenario both sides sure do need psychiatric help!
Notes
1 Page-199-Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Lahore-1973.
2 Page-188-The Pakistan Army-1966-1971-Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired)-Wajid Alis Limited-Lahore-1990.
3 I had the privilege of serving in 15 SP in its 'R' Battery which was one of the units of 8 Independent Armoured Brigade, under Major Zohrab,one of the most upright officers that I came across in the army, from 9 August 1984 to 10th October 1984 in Kharian as well as Dhamtal-Qila Sobha Singh area,at a time when war was imminent, and thus was able to interview many gunners who had taken part in the Barapind Battle.15 SP in 1984 was still equipped with Priest Self Propelled Guns of WW Two vintage,which it had at the time of Battle of Barapind.In 1984 these guns although extremely efficiently handled were at the last leg of their life,and this in itself was a direct tribute to 15 SPs excellence as a unit.
4 Most Pakistani authors while discussing 1 Corps operations conveniently omit mentioning 6 Armoured Division.This includes General Shaukat Riza who wrote the officially sponsored history of the 1971 war.Shaukat did not mention at all in his book that the 6 Armoured Division was also in I Corps area of operations around a place called Pasrur and gave no reason why this division was condemned to stationary guard duty throughout the war! Unfortunately instead of dispassionately analysing our previous wars,there has been a marked tendency in our country,that motivates military historians to rationalise all our failures by citing the excuse that we were outnumbered and all the battles where our military commanders blundered were ones in which defeat or failure was inevitable.
5 Page-199-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit.
6 Page-190-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
7 Page-191-Ibid.
8 Page-190-Ibid.
10 A lazy second line para military force which performs sentry duty at various ordnance factories. Thus in planning terms Pakistan's numerical superiority and technical parity in armour by virtue of 6 Armoured Division and the considerable infantry resources of 17 Division although available were assigned no role in the area of operations.Why this was done has not been touched at all by Shaukat Riza and Gul Hassan in their otherwise lengthy accounts?
11 Page-29-The Western Front-Lt Gen K.P Candeth (Retired)-Allied Publishers-New Delhi-1984.
12 Page-495-The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1941-1971-Maj Gen Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi-1993.
13 Page-65-Candeth-Op Cit and page-495-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. This led to despatch of 33 Infantry Brigade of 39 Division to Poonch on 21 November,since the Pakistani build up opposite Poonch had started from November.
14 Page-213-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit and page-195-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit and Page-72-The Battle of Chamb-Lt Col Saeed-Army Education Press-GHQ-Rawalpindi-1979.
15 The assertion by many eminent personalities in Pakistan Armoured Corps in particular that the Indians got two nights to consolidate their position before 8 Armoured Brigade attacked it on the morning of 16 December 1971 has no conection with facts,and is merely a figment of these honourable gentlemen's cavalier imagination! General Jahangir Karamat who was one of the squadron commanders in 13 Lancers at Barapind admitted that 'At 0430 hours on 16th December the infantry formation in defence informed the armoured brigade headquarters that the enemy had breached the minefield at Basantar Nala at Lagwal' (Page-3- 'The Tank Attack that Failed'- Brigadier Jahangir Karamat- Sabre and Lance Magazine-1982 Issue-School of Armour Nowshera-1983.
16 Page-511-Indian Army after Independence-Major K.C Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-1987.This was Lieutenant Colonel V.Ghai of 16 Madras.The three infantry battalions of this brigade were 3 Grenadiers,6 Madras and 16 Madras).
17 Page-510-Ibid.
18 Page-504-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.
18a Ibid and Page-513-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.Authors Note;-The Jat Sikhs of Hissar were an extremely tough lot famous for rowdiness and riotous habits.This was noted by an ICS officer Badruddin Tayyabji who served in Hissar before partition.The Jat Sikhs of Sisana and surrounding villages were famous before partition for distilling 'illicit home made liqour also known as Desi'.This created a close bond between them and many Ranghar Muslims of the same district!After partition many Ranghar Muslims of Sisana settled in Multan,Khanewal and Vihari districts and continue to brew excellent Desi with a far superior impact than any western brand, as per the 'Sisana' recipee!I have been always curious to know whether Sisana is still famous for the Desi which many old Ranghar armoured corps soldiers of Hissar used to nostalgically remember long after partition!
18bIbid.
18c Ibid.
19 Page-2-'Sabre and Lance' Issue-1982-Op Cit .
20 Page-215-Fazal Muqeem Khan.Late Major General Abdullah Saeed described 1 Corps Headquarters in 1971 as a headquarter struck by inertia and a paralysis.It is impossible to substantiate this assertion,but a dispassionate analysis of the 1 Corps battle proves that decisiveness,resolution or energy in conduct of operations were certainly not the hallmarks of 1 Corps Commander's personality.
21 Page-3-'Sabre and Lance'-Op Cit.
22 Ibid.
23 Page-194-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
24 Ibid.
25 A Role in which tanks occupy hides covering the most likely enemy tank approaches.from these the tanks move to pre arranged and possibly pre prepared fire positions with the aim of halting the enemy attack which has penetrated in between localities or overrun them' (Refers-GSP-1518-Armoured Regiment in Battle-1972).The Glossary of Military Terms GSP-1538 of 1973 defined counter penetration as 'The action taken by a defender to halt penetration of his defences by the enemy and to destroy by fire enemy forces which have penetrated between his defended localities'.
26 Page-194 & 195-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit and Page-3-'Sabre and Lance'-Op Cit.General Jahangir Karamat specifically stated that the CO of 13 Lancers stated the number of enemy tanks to be not more than 'six or seven'.Thus there is a discrepancy here in between Shaukat Riza and Jahangir's account.
27 Page-3-Sabre and Lance-Op Cit.
28 Page-4-Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Page-507-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.It may be noted that 13 Lancers was never ordered to capture the 'Carthage or Rome' that Barapind was but to go into counter penetration opposite Jarpal.This undue emphasis on the glory of capturing villages with mud houses or stating that they were never driven out is a good indicator of the extreme myopicness of the Indo-Pak military mind!The Kargil episode with both sides making claims of retaining or capturing Tiger Hill etc proves that despite all the NDCs and AFWCs the emphasis still is on tactical gains rather than at anything more significant.
31 Page-506-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.The Indian Armoured Corps historian praised 13 Lancers gallantry mentioning in particular Major Nisar (actually Major Nasir later Brigadier Khwaja Mohammad Nasir or Pervez Nasir).The 13 Lancers did extremely well what they were told to do as far as their squadron commanders and all lower echelons were concerned.Posterity will remember the services of all who participated in that grim battle from major and downwards.
31a Page-514-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.
32 Page-507-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.
33 Page-4-Sabre and Lance-Op Cit.
34 Page-4-Ibid.
35 Page-196-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
36 Page-196-Ibid.
37 Page-508 and 509-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.
38 Page-215 and 216-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit.
39 Page-188-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
40 Page-194-Ibid.
41 Brigadier Ahmad was described by most armoured corps officers as one of the finest and most competent officers of the armoured corps.
41a Nasir was conspicuous in being praised by both Gurcharan Singh and K.C Praval (refers-page513-K.C Praval-op cit and page-506-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit).I think the only Major at least from armoured corps,so openly and frankly praised by the Indians for leading his squadron from the front .It's a pity that he never became a major general!
42 Page-194-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
43 Page-148-The Punjab in Peace and War-S.S Thorburn-1904-London
44 Page-20-The History of the Indian Mountain Artillery-Brig Gen C.A.L Graham-Aldershot-Gale and Polden-1957.
45 Based on K.C Praval and Candeths books-Op Cit.
46 Page-197-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
47 Page-3-The Birth of the Modern World Society-1815-1830-Paul Johnson-Harper Collins-New York-1991.The exact casualties were:-British:-291 killed and remaining missing/wounded;US:-13 Killed,29 Wounded and 19 Missing.
48 Page-135 and 136-Tank Commanders-George Forty-Firebird Books-UK-1993.
1 comments:
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